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ABSTRACT
It is or should be well known that land value grows faster in
areas farther from the center in a growing city. Closely
related is the tendency that the gradient of urban population
density flattens over time. An analytical explanation is given
by a comparative static and a dynamic extension of the simple
models of the monocentric city and the capital market.
In a monocentric city whose population, household income, or
transportation efficiency is growing continuously, the rate of
land value appreciation increases with distance from the city
center up to the settlement limit. Beyond the limit, the rate
decreases with distance. The opposite will be the case if the
city is declining in any one of the aspects of city size. The
pattern obtains under a wide range of specifications regarding
consumption and production parameters, expectation of market
agents, and durability of land use. Existing empirical studies
are reviewed and are seen to render strong and abundant support
for the analytical conclusion. In addition, the predicted
spatial distribution of land value appreciation rate is
directly tested by a regression analyis of the land value data
of Seoul, Korea.
The dynamic analysis unveils several important properties of
land use involving durable and inflexible housing. Two implica-
tions are noteworthy. The density of housing structure remains
constant over long stretches of time and distance if develo-
pers behave with little consideration for future changes in
demand (myopic expectations). With full anticipation of future
changes, it is shown that land is withheld from development if
the growth rate of housing value is higher than a certain
fraction of the discount rate. An application of the analy-
tical framework shows that a tax on housing rental or the pro-
perty value reduces land use density and land value, more
severely in areas farther from the city center.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton, Ph.D.
Associate Professor,
Departments of Economics and
of Urban Studies'and Planning
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION and SUMMARY
1.1 The Issue
Dynamic evolution is an essential nature of the contempo-
rary city. Its population grows, residents' income rises, and
technology develops. Along with these come changes in land
value and land use forms. The latter changes do not lend
themselves easily to brief yet meaningful summary indications
for the city as a whole for they usually are not uniform across
areas within a city: in short, the city not only grows or
declines in an aggregate sense but its spatial structure under-
goes transformation. The same can be said about cross-
sectional comparison of cities: they differ not only in size
but also in the pattern of land value and population distri-
bution. Part of the variations would be due to purely random
factors present at specific times and places. But there also
are found unmistakeable systematic patterns of variation linked
to aggregate measures of a city.
This thesis is a contribution to the study of the urban
spatial structure and its change, an old tradition in urban
studies in general and urban economics in particular. This
chapter identifies important practical and theoretical issues
that this thesis adresses, main points of our arguments, and
characteristics of our methodological approaches to them.
Let us first consider the issue of different rates of land
value change within a city. This subject of great practical
interest will be the focus of our analyses in this thesis
though it has not been given comensurate attention by urban
economic theorists. It is commonly understood that urban land
values rise roughly in step with urban growth. Equally well
known is the fact that some parts of the city, urban fringe
areas in particular, experience much faster growth of land
value than others. How and why does the difference come about?
The answer to this question is sought by various segments of
the society: investors, developers, home-buyers, and public
agencies. A plethora of theories have come from diverse intel-
lectual angles and are vigorously debated for or against on
theoretical, empirical, and perhaps ideological grounds. In the
following let us briefly comment on a few popular theories.
The cause-effect chain of different land value growth is
rather obvious in case the causal factors are well localized:
public investments favoring a few selected areas, for example.
A spurious application of this line of reasoning has it that,
since more new housing is built in outlying areas of a city,
that is where the land value will increase more - which in most
part seems little more than a confusion of causation and asso-
ciation. A more reasonable version finds the cause of the fast
appreciation in suburban land value in the concentration of
public infrastructure investments there. But the actual pattern
of investment distribution is not so clearly lopsided if one
considers a full range of public outlays; and, even so, such
effects are found to be responsible for a relatively small part
of land value increases. (See, for example, Maisel, 1964.)
Most often, however, the "explosion" of peripheral land
values is attributed to "speculation", a term that is employed
to designate numerous disparate processes. Perhaps the term is
most popularly used to signify various breakdowns of the compe-
titive market: monopoly in the suburban land market, informa-
tional inefficiencies leading to speculative bubbles, wide-
spread outright fraud, etc. Many economists have pointed out
that these arguments have little logical or empirical validity
with possible exceptions for a very limited duration or
locality.(See Carr and Smith 1975, for example.) Nevertheless,
in boom markets there certainly appears to be a large presence
of speculators who are primarily interested in reselling rather
than in using land. Therefore, while rejecting the above
extreme hypotheses, many still try to define and explain the
rapid price rises as effects of speculation, though within the
framework of conventional economics.
In one conventional sense, the function of speculators is
intertemporal arbitrage, withholding a piece of land from com-
mitting it to the immediate highest yield in favor of better
long-term benefits, presumably higher capital gains. Provided
that the landowner's expectation is rational, however, this
action will produce lower, not higher, average rates of land
value appreciation. As the actual expectations are more often
inaccurate, land value will fluctuate more but will not neces-
sarily grow faster on average. The existence of uncertainty and
fluctuations brings into play the second meaning of specula-
tion, risk arbitrage, in which higher rates of return are
obtained for higher risk, such as that usually characterizes
expectations concerning fringe areas. But, contrary to intui-
tion, the effect of uncertainty on the rate of appreciation is
ambiguous (see chapter 2 below.)
In short, under close examination, the intuitive appeals
of the above popular theories fail to transtlate into any
consistently or generally convincing explanation for the issue.
Neither, however, have the critics of these arguments come up
with any specific alternatives. Partly for this reason it does
not appear fruitful to elaborate on these various arguments.
Rather, we begin our analysis by breaking away from the implicit
but apparent premise shared by both sides of the above debates:
that land value should increase at the same rate across the
city if the market is operating efficientLy without monopolies,
uncertainties, and the like. Instead we simply ask how land
value in different parts of a city would grow in just such a
market.
Our analysis shows that competitive resource allocation
for a growing city would produce an equilibrium spatial pattern
such that the land value appreciation rate will be the greatest
at the frontier of the city and decreases with distance in
either direction, toward the city center or farther into the
agricultural area. There is a substantial body of empirical
evidence that corroborates this description, but we make the
assertion primarily on the basis of a deduction from a simpli-
fied equilibrium model of the city and the capital market
emphasizing the trade-off mechanism between accessibility,
space, and other consumption goods.
As such our analysis cannot be considered a necessary and
sufficient explanation for the said pattern. In other words,
the fact that the real world behaves as the theory predicts
does not prove the existence of a perfect market nor the irre-
levance of other possible causes. With this qualification,
however, the empirical evidence suggests the relative producti-
vity of our simple analysis in describing the reality. Also,
being consistent with established principles, our model is a
firmer foundation upon which to examine relevant factors,
possibly including the ones mentioned above, than the unques-
tioned norm of a uniform rate of land value change for a city.
We demonstrate this point by considering aspects of speculation
employing our own framework of analysis.
Beyond the immediate concern with land values, the analy-
sis can be genaralized to other issues involving related
variables. First, due to the duality between price and demand,
our prediction about the spatial pattern of land value change
can be directly transtlated into that of land use intensity:
that density of land use increases more rapidly in areas
farther from the city center when the city grows. This phe-
nomenon of flattening density gradient has been recognized and
explained by urban economists vastly better than the case of
land value dynamics. Still, our analysis represents an
improvement in consistency, clarity, and generality.
Another important extension can be made to determine the
effects of the property tax, another city-wide parameter that
potentially has differential impacts on land value and use of
different locations within a jurisdiction. Because of the
importance of the property tax in the local economy the sub-
ject has not escaped the interests of economists, but mostly
the interest has been in aggregate or inter-jurisdictional
effect of different rates of the tax and not in the spatial
distribution of the impact of a uniform tax rate within a
jurisdiction. This latter aspect, however, apparently has sig-
nificant implications on the matter of equity and efficiency of
resource use. Employing the same methods as applied in analyz-
ing growth impacts, we show that an addition to a uniform rate
of tax on property income or value would in general produce
disproportionately severe impacts on properties in outlying
areas, both in terms of loss of income to the owners and
reduction of land use intensity.
1.2 Methodological Summary
A general concept underlies all the above predictions:
that pieces of urban land take on different characteristics as
economic goods, as they become "adapted spaces" and differen-
tiated according to socio-economically defined locational
attributes. It is not surprising, then, to find that different
locations respond differently to a shock which in itself is not
specific to any location, just as demand for and prices of
different commodities in an economy react differently to taxa-
tion, income growth, etc.
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The concept of the city as a set of differentiated spaces
is embodied in general equilibrium theories of urban land use,
particularly the monocentric city models, in the form of syste-
matic differentiation of land use activities and land rent.
These static models have spun off a growing body of theoretical
and empirical researches that have substantially advanced our
understanding of changes in land use patterns. This thesis
belongs to this tradition, adding some substantial and methodo-
logical innovations within a unified framework, with more em-
phasis on dynamics, deductive methods and on the subject of
land value change.
As mentioned earlier, the phenomenon of flattening density
gradient has received the most attention from urban economists
among many aspects of spatially differentiated change. The
empirical tendency itself has been well known for over three
decades since Colin Clark's study (1951). But a full develop-
ment of economic studies on the subject owes its beginning to
the establishment of monocentric urban models. Especially,
Muth's theoretical and empirical studies (1969) offered the
first full scale and coherent account of different patterns of
population distribution anchored in his equilibrium model of
the city, which remains as a standard. Subsequently, numerous
studies have been produced, most of them providing impressive
amounts of empirical support for the general trend of flat-
tening density gradients, and for Muth's identification of
greater income, population, and transportation efficiency as
major factors contributing to this trend. All in all, this
accumulation of studies has left Muth's original theoretical
studies essentially intact.
However, as discussed in our review below, Muth's theore-
tical analysis for his comparative study of population density
gradients is only loosely and partially connected to his formal
model of the urban spatial structure. From a formal viewpoint,
the efforts by Muth and the subsequent researchers can be
characterized more as an estimation of a reduced form equation
evaluating likely determinants of density gradients than as an
explicit development of a structural model. That approach may
not be faulted too much, considering the complexity of actual
urban spatial strucutres for which the existing models seem too
drastic a simplification. On the other hand, disadvantages of
concentrating only on the reduced form equation estimation are
well known: opaqueness about interdependencies among variables,
susceptibility to weakness of data, inherent limitation on
generality, etc. Muth's analysis needs to be re-evaluated also
in light of recent estimates of the critical parameter values
that he used in his analysis.
There is a growing theoretical literature on comparative
static and dynamic analysis based on monocentric models comple-
menting the above empirically oriented research. But, unlike
the latter, progress seems far from the point of saturation. On
the other hand, except for many intuitive theories some of
which were discussed before, there have been few systematic
studies, empirical or theoretical, on the subject of land value
change. This.is surprising in view of the theoretical as well
as practical significance of the price variable. The notorious
problem of availability and quality of land value data seems to
be at least partly responsible for this lack of research, so
far as it limits the productivity of efforts toward empirical
generalization.
In short, we see a distinct imbalance between theoretical
versus empirical works on land use change and between those on
land use versus land value. By putting more emphasis on
general and deductive approach
static and dynamic analyses,
focus on land value change,
conclusions regarding the negl
also help clarify some of the a
the existing analyses of land u
A complete set of basic c
Alonso's monocentric model, wh
Muth's, has been presented by W
direction of changes in major v
that utilizes both comparative
and organizing the study with a
we can not only derive explicit
ected issue of land value, but
nalytical ambiguities present in
se change.
omparative static properties of
ich is essentially equivalent to
heaton (1974). He determined the
ariables -- rent, city boundary,
utility level, and population density -- resulting from impor-
tant types of exogenous shocks in two ideal types of the city.
He also confirmed the hypothesis of flattening density and rent
gradients when income is increasing and when transportation
cost is decreasing in a closed city.
We start our spatial analysis in chapter 2 by extending
Wheaton's study to complete the enumeration of changes in the
rent gradient. We again confirm the tendency that rent and
population density gradients flatten with urban growth. In
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other words (the equivalence of the two expressions is exp-
lained in Chapter 2), rent goes up faster in outlying areas, as
population, income, and transportation efficiency grow in a
closed or an open city. We also show that natural and legal
constraints to urban expansion such as waterfront or green-belt
have the same effect as the above. But the results depend
critically upon the premise of inelastic demand for land with
respect to price, which is well supported by recent consen-
suses. With an opposite assumption, as adopted by Muth, the
results would in some cases be reversed or become ambiguous.
The relationship between rent and value changes is derived
from conditions of capital market equilibrium. According to
this, the above pattern of rent changes implies that land value
also increases faster at farther distances from the center in a
continually growing city. But the appreciation rate decreases
with distance beyond the city limit under rational expectations.
Asset value and hence its change are also dependent upon
the discount rate which varies with the market interest rate,
risk and tax rate. An increase in the discount rate would
decrease land values, particularly the fast growing ones. Its
general effect on appreciation rate is ambiguous, but the
effect is likely to be negative in areas to be soon urbanized,
although the conventional wisdom argues that a higher discount
rate always accelerates the appreciation. Our analysis suggests
that the risky nature of suburban land markets may not be the
cause of high rates of appreciation by itself; rather, the area
is intrinsically highly sensitive to small reductions in uncer-
tainty or interest rates brought about by urban or general
economic growth.
At this point it seems necessary to examine the rationale
of the monocentric city model, since many of its assumptions
are obviously unrealistic. The confines of the model are never-
theless accepted by many simply because it is quite useful
despite its restrictions, and because there are few effective
alternatives for description of the spatial structure and its
evolution for a city as a whole. Consider, for example, the
most frequently raised question about the assumption of mono-
centricity, defining household locations solely in terms of the
accessibility to a single center of the city, ignoring diffuse
travel destinations, amenities, neighborhood externalities,
etc. Although the criticism is factually irrefutable, the
assumption can be defended as a useful simplification on
theoretical and empirical grounds.
With any set of locational attributes, the unique concep-
tual issues distinguishing the problem of locational choice
from other consumption decisions remain basically the same: the
socio-economic definition and differentiation of space, as
discussed earlier, and the non-convexity of the consumption set
due to the constraint that a household must occupy only one
site, not a combination of many. Therefore, the properties of
trade-off involving accessibility to the center are pertinent
to many other dimensions. This sort of generalization has been
shown to be possible at the cost of complexity and inability to
close a model without added arbitrary specifications. Except
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for some specialized purposes, however, it may not be worth the
trouble since perhaps the most important problem of externali-
ties are left unaccounted for by most extensions of the sort.
Even if relaxing the assumption of monocentricity is pos-
sible and may add a few theoretical insights, it is not very
useful in an empirical sense because of the difficulty in
defining a simple and generally applicable vector of diverse
locational dimensions, particularly if one wants a comparison
among cities or times. Witness the difficulty in dealing with
just the accessibility to the center. Studies have shown that
this is not always the dominant determinant of land value but
is nevertheless a robust one across cities, thus permitting a
simple and clear common dimension.
Another major question concerns the use of comparative
static analysis where it is assumed that urban land use can be
adjusted instantaneously and costlessly under
changing market conditions. In analyzing the supply of housing,
this obviously is a very unsatisfactory premise in view of the
extreme durability of urban structures. Still, it eventually
turns out to be a good approximation in many respects; but this
justification is one of our results, and many other dynamic
analyses have shown otherwise. Above all, it is impossible for
us to sidestep the issue, because we are primarily and expli-
citly interested in land value, not in the statically defined
land rent which is neither observed or otherwise relevant in
actual markets of land for durable developments.
Recently there has been a great deal of interest in
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dynamic analyses of urban land use, mostly within the framework
of a monocentric city model. But as we have mentioned above,
the issue of land value has received little consistent or
explicit treatment. This lack of attention to the price mecha-
nism is perhaps related to difficulties of obtaining clear
analytical statements regarding the evolution of land use.
In contrast, our dynamic analysis starts with a careful
reexamination of well-known principles of land value determina-
tion as well as of optimal land use (chapter 3). This unveils
several essential properties of land value that have not been
paid due attention in existing studies. It also reveals limita-
tions of popularly adopted analytical compromises in dealing
with land value under conditions of durability. We suggest an
approach to the study of shadow land rent and land value dyna-
mics that is not encumbered with procrustean simplifications of
durable land use. We study information conferred by a well-
functioning land market that is analytically as well as practi-
cally crucial in determining optimal strategy of land use with
durable housing. For example, development or redevelopment of
land for urban use is withheld if the value of housing incre-
ases faster than a certain limit determined by the discount
rate and the factor share of land in construction. The cons-
truction input at redevelopment would be about ten times as
much as the existing structure.
These formulations define properties of supply of durable
housing. The spatio-temporal pattern of housing demand can be
easily adapted from the comparative static analysis of the
second chapter. Combining these in chapter 4, we obtain a model
of dynamic evolution of land use and value that is quite
general in its topical and methodological scope.
Patterns of land value distribution and appreciation are
shown to be qualitatively the same as the comparative static
patterns: land value always declines with distance from the
city center, and its rate of appreciation peaks at the urban
border in a growing city and declines with distance inward or
outward.
As to the evolution of land use, we answer a few theo-
retical questions left unresolved. For example, we define in
what sense it is "normal" for a city to expand outwardly from
the center. Conversely we suggest that outside-in or inter-
mittent urban expansion occurs if, for example, the population
grows while income is decreasing or if more land becomes avail-
able while the urban economy remains stagnant otherwise.
Further, if developers' expectations are rational, the structu-
ral and population density will generally decline with
distance, at least in the initial round of development. In case
developers operate under myopic expectations, density of
housing would be the same for all locations that have housing
vintages belonging to a same generation. That is, the ratio of
structural input to land is identical for every housing that is
originally built on the converted farm land regardless of the
location and the date of the original development; it is
another identical value, higher than the original housing
density, if the housing is the replacement of the original
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building; another if the housing is the third inhabitant of the
land, etc. Despite this, population density is shown to de-
crease with distance in general though it can increase or stay
constant over distance if the size of an individual house is
fixed and the utility level of household decreases in the
process of urban growth.
In the last analytical chapter (5), we employ the methods
of previous chapters to study the spatial incidence of a
property tax on housing in a city. First, under the comparative
static framework, we show that an ad valorem tax on housing
rental would affect the value and intensity of land use more
adversely in outer areas of an open city, in addition to the
already known aggregate effect of reduced city size. In the
case of a closed city, the same pattern as in the open city is
likely to prevail but with more ambiguity.
We also analyze the case of an open city with durable
housing. We show that the tax on housing rental will again be
felt more severely in locations farther from the center. In
dynamic analysis, an important question concerns the timing of
development and redevelopment. We obtain the result that a
higher tax would delay and reduce the intensity of development
or redevelopment of land if factor substitution is inelastic.
Under the framework of dynamic analysis we can analyze the
tax assessed on the capital value of a property that is more
common in practice than the tax on housing rental dealt with in
most conventional analysis. This system of tax in effect raises
the discount rate applicable to the rental income stream. This
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causes differences in growth rates of value to affect the
impact of the tax. We show that impacts of this tax are similar
to the case with the tax on housing rental income with slight
twists. For example, the property tax can facilitate land
development in outlying areas in an open or a closed city.
Property values will generally decline, and redevelopment in
inner areas will be discouraged as in the case with rental
income taxation. The gradient of land value steepens under
both types of taxation as a result of a higher tax.
In the last chapter, we review existing theoretical and
empirical research on the evolution of the urban spatial struc-
ture in light of the foregoing anaysis. This is not meant to be
exbaustive. Rather, the focus is mainly about how and why some
well-known past theoretical studies differ from ours, how far
empirical studies support our hypotheses, and what are impor-
tant remaining ambiguities.
Elsewhere in the present chapter we mentioned the impor-
tance and shortcomings of Muth's theory of population distribu-
tion. Details of these arguments will be presented first, along
with summaries of a few empirical works on flattening density
gradient. A substantial departure from Muth's model was made by
Harrison and Kain's model of incremental urban growth (1974)
formalized by Anas(1978). Their model introduces a very impor-
tant conceptual element, but cannot be considered a definite
improvement over the standard theory in either theoretical
refinement or empirical approximation. The conceptual rigidity
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of these earlier cumulative growth models are being corrected
by later developments in dynamics, notably by Brueckner and
Wheaton, and we show in some detail how our study complements
these analyses.
There are many empirical studies on cross-sectional or
historical variations of urban population density gradients,
notably by Muth (1969) and Mills (1972, 1980). Studies on land
value distribution are less in number and in quality. Although
data and estimation methods used in all these studies cannot be
termed highly reliable, they as a whole can be seen to provide
a consistent support for most observable parts of our theoreti-
cal conclusions. To complement the existing indirect or casual
evidence we provide a more direct test of the hypothesis about
land value appreciation by using the land value series of
Seoul, Korea. The result again renders an impressive support
for our prediction, particularly considering the degree of
abstraction involved.
In recapitulation, our analysis can be characterized as an
operationalization and application of the two basic equilibrium
concepts essential to understanding urban land use and value:
economic differentiation of space in terms of accessibility,
and land value as a derived present value. These old concepts
and their formalizations have probably been under-utilized. Use
of these tools in this study has yielded considerable light on
matters of academic and practical interests.
Of course, one should excercise caution not to project the
theoretical implications literally onto reality, for our formal
model considers only a few elements among the enormous complex-
ity of the urban process in a deterministic framework. Compared
with existing studies on similar subjects, however, we sacri-
fice little scope in order to gain rigor and clarity. In fact,
our analytical innovations enable us to consider many important
issues that were formerly left unaccounted for in a consistent
manner. For example, our dynamic representation of land value
permits an explicit comparison between effects of a property
value tax on land use intensity and timing in different parts
of a city. Overall, our analysis presents a complement to the
substantial body of literature with similar aims and approach
by offering substantial refinements, elaborations, and
sometimes, disagreements.
1.3 Notes on Exposition
Convention allows many alternative terms for each of the
important variables considered in this research. Nevertheless,
for the sake of consistency, we will employ a unique term for
each variable throughout the remainder of this thesis. The
choices are made principally in order to avoid confusion, as
there are no definite logical grounds in most cases.
We retain the use of the terms"price" and "cost" in the
generic meaning with careful qualifications such as "rental
price of housing". Although neoclassical economics has all but
totally obliterated the distinction between "value" and
"price", we shall use the former for a specialized meaning of
present or capitalized value of a long-lived asset. In cont-
rast, "rent" and "rental" are used for the hire price of land
and housing, respectively, for use for a limited duration. We
choose the term "housing rental" in order to distinguish it
from land rent and also from the contract rent that includes
operating expenses and which is usually expressed as gross rent
or simply rent. We use the "discount rate" effective for capi-
talization as that which includes not only the market "inter-
est" for funds but also other relevant factors such as risk.
Secondly, we need to clarify what physical entities these
price terms are for. In urban economics, especially the recent
literature on durable housing, the most popular term meaning
the component of housing other than land is "(durable) capi-
tal". But this could be confusing as to its inclusion of land
which is essentially a form of capital, on the one hand, or of
labor and other non-material inputs for construction, on the
other hand. Therefore, we prefer a more straightforward
"(durable) structure." This is a combination of a variety of
material and labor inputs. "Housing" again is a composite
commodity, a combination of structure and land (and other
permanent improvements such as sewage and grading that are
ignored in our analysis by the assumption of physical homoge-
neity of land.) As such, these are not strictly homogeneous
physical quantities but economic quantities essentially de-
fined by the market. We assume that such a definition is unique
and stable, following the standard practice. We do not see the
need to distinguish between occupation of a unit versus
consumption of its service.
As we rely heavily on a postulate-deductive mode of analy-
sis, we find it convenient to organize the presentation around
a series of dependent but self-contained propositions. But, in
order to avoid excessive formalism, they are made to be speci-
fic and empirically applicable as far as possible rather than
general and empirically non-committal. For example, instead of
stating a general theorem, "If 'a' then 'A', If 'b' then 'B',
etc.", preceded by "If 'x' and 'y' then 'a', If 'y' and 'z'
then 'c', etc.; we will in most cases simply state a proposi-
tion "A", having formerly determined that "a" is the most
plausible situation. The general case will be discussed in the
proof.
For mathematical notation, we will use R'(x;x=b, t=tl) to
mean the partial derivative of R with respect to x at b and tl,
omitting the designations when they are not particularly signi-
ficant. R"(x,t) is likewise a second partial derivative. When
the ordinary and partial derivatives are one and the same, or
when there is no danger of confusion, we will use the notation
for an ordinary derivative for convenience. * is used for a
logarithmic derivative, or the rate of change. Thus, R*(t) =
R'(t)/R is the rate of change in rent, R, over time, t.
Frequently used symbols are listed in the following.
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List of Symbols
x : distance from the city center
t : time
B : distance of the city boundary from the center
N total population of the city
n population per area (population density)
y income of a household
U utility of a household
L land consumed per household
H housing consumed per household
Z quantity of composite good other than land (or housing)
a(x) transportation cost to city center from distance x
Q : quantity of housing per land area
k : quantity of structural input per land area
R : rent per unit area of land
V : present (asset) value of land
r : dicount rate
g : rate of increase in land value
p : rental price of housing net of operating cost
F(t) : present value of housing rental for the life span
of a new housing built at time t.
A(t) : value of leasehold of land for the life span of the
new housing
c : unit purchase price of structural input
List of Symbols (continued)
E(R) own price elasticity of demand for land, compensated
E(^R): the same, ordinary or uncompensated
E(p) : own price elasticity of demand for housing, compensated
E(yL): income elasticity of demand for land
S : elasticity of substitution between land and structure
in housing production
m : rate of tax on rental income of housing property
w : rate of tax on asset value of housing property
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CHAPTER 2. COMPARATIVE STATICS of LAND VALUE
and POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
2.1 Equilibrium of a Monocentric City
A household's land use decision as a location decision is
different from other consumption choices as it must choose one or
few locations foregoing any other. But, like other consumption,
it has also to decide how much. Since attractively located lots
such as those close to CBD or commanding good vistas are in
limited supply, competition forces a trade-off among many loca-
tional attributes, amount of space, and other consumption goods
through the price mechanism. Alonso's model (1964) describes such
a land allocation mechanism with land differentiated solely in
terms of distance to the city center. Other authors published
models with essentially similar frameworks, though with slightly
different practical aims and theoretical structures. For example,
the most well-known among them, Muth's (1969) model focuses
housing rather than land but otherwise turns out to be formally
equivalent to Alonso's in describing urban spatial structure.
These monocentric city models, so called for their common
simpifying assumption of a single activity center for a city,
have first been used mainly to explain characteristic urban forms
in terms of distribution of rent, population densities, and
income classes. Muth used the model also to describe variations
of the pattern. As discussed in the last chapter, however, his
analysis which has been adopted by most subsequent researchers of
population distribution, cannot be called a true comparative
static analysis. A general and comprehensive comparative static
analysis of Alonso's monocentric model has been provided by
Wheaton (1974). In this section we review the equilibrium model
as deve-cped by Alonso and Wheaton and discuss its isomorphism
with Muth's model for the starting point of our comparative
static and dynamic extensions.
A household, the only type of land user in this model,
makes a location decision as part of the overall consumption
decision maximizing utility derived from land, L, and the
composite good, Z.
max U = U(ZL)
subject to the budget constraint (2.1)
y > Z + R(x)L + a(x)
where price of the composite good, invariant over location, is
taken as the numeraire, R(x) is the rent per land area at loca-
tion x, and a(x) is transportation cost incurred at the location.
Location is here defined solely by the distance from the city
center to which every household travel is assumed to be made.
Defining the location in such a drastically simple manner, versus
defining or simply interpreting x as a vector of many locational
attributes, should be viewed as a matter of theoretical and
empirical convenience as discussed in Section 1.2.
A landowner maximizes his income by awarding the land to
the highest bidder of rent. In a competitive market, these maxi-
mization efforts on both sides yield a pair of first order condi-
tions defining a schedule of the
will allow it a certain level of
rents bid by the household that
utility regardless of location.
R(x) = U'(L)/U'(Z) = [y - Z - a(x)]/L(x)
for U(x) = U at all x.
(2.2)
This system of relations, equations (2.1) and (2.2), then yields
a solution for each of the endogenous decision variables, L, Z,
R, in terms of parameters, U, y, a(x).
Wheaton has determined fundamental properties of this
household location equilibrium as the following set of theorems
under a very general assumption that land and the composite good
are both normal goods, that is, both have positive income effects























dU'(Z)/dx = L'(x) [U"(LZ) - U"(Z)R] > 0





ence curve. The second defines the directions of change in con-
sumption of land and the composite commodity as a result of
change in basic parameters. The envelope theorem is employed in
deriving the third Theorem that specifies the changes in bid
rent following changes in the parameters. The fourth states that
the marginal utility of the composite good and hence the
marginal utility 'of nominal income increases with distance,
because the total consumption outlay decreases by the amount of
transportation cost.
In Muth's model, households' utility is expressed as a
function of the composite good and housing, a combination of land
and structure. In other words, the household's utility maximiza-
tion problem is now stated just like the maximization in terms of
land and the composite good (equation (2.1)) except that housing
is substituted for land and housing rental for land rent,
max U = U(Z, H(h,L)) (2.1.H)
subject to y > Z + p(x)H + a(x)
where H is quantity of housing consumed
h is the amount of structural input for housing
p(x) is the marginal rental price of housing
Strictly speaking, the composite good, Z, in the above does not
include the housing structure and thus is a smaller subset of the
composite good in Alonso's model. However, we will maintain the
same symbol to denote the "other" goods than the quantity in
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focus, land or housing.
Implicit in this formulation is the weak separability of
the utility function in housing and the composite goods, that the
marginal rate of substitution between land and structure is
independent of the other consumption. This assumption is no
stronger than that implied in Alonso's framework where the margi-
nal substitution between housing structure and other goods is
independent of the amount of land consumed. If housing preference
is separable from other consumption, the production of housing
using land and structure can be uniquely defined, and the house-
hold's consumption can be specified only in terms of quantity of
housing regardless of the proportion of land and structure put
in housing.
Once we adopt this framework, spatial equilibrium of house-
holds involving land as a distinct consumption good can be
exactly duplicated to the one involving housing. Distribution of
the rental price for housing equalizes the utility obtainable in
different locations, and the land rent schedule equalizes housing
producers' profit at zero. Deferring discussioin of relationships
between the production and consumption, we obtain the first order
conditions of household maximization of exactly the same form as
the above, with housing (H) and its rental price (p) substituted
for L and R. Thus it is apparent that all the above analyses and
Theorems would hold exactly for Muth's model with appropriate
substitution of variables of consumption. That is, the marginal
rental price of housing is written
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p = U'(H)/U'(Z) = (y - a(x) - Z)/H
And the third Theorem of Wheaton's, for example, can be restated
as Theorem 3H:
p'(U) = -l/HU'(Z) ; p'(y) = 1/H
p'(x) = -a'(x)/H ; p'(a) = -x/H
Solutions for land consumption and rent can then be ob-
tained through the housing production function which we will
examine in detail in the next chapter. This will be a more invol-
ved process, but the final solutions should not be different in
the two versions because under the assumption of malleable struc-
ture and a competitive market the land demand and rent should be
the same whether land is considered as a separate and direct
utility argument or an indirect one as a factor of production. In
case structure and land are considered inseparable because of
durability of the combination, this equivalence would not hold
exactly, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
If the two theoretical models are equivalent for the compa-
rative static analysis, the simplicity and generality of Alonso's
model dictate that we utilize this as far as possible. In this
framework, the specification of the model is completed by consi-
dering citywide equilibrium conditions which will constrain the
local equilibrium defined above. The first (border) condition is
that land can be used for residence only if it is bid away from
alternative uses. In this model the alternative use is agricul-
( 2. 2.H)
ture whose bid rent is assumed to be constant over time and
location. In other words, the urban bid rent at the city border,
B, must be as large as the farm rent, R(f).
R(B) = R(f) (2.3)
The second condition specifies total population of the city, N,
that must be housed within the boundary. Letting d the available
radian of land at distance x,
B O(x)x
N = dx (2.4)
0 L(x)
A solution of the complete system requires specifying all
but two of the six parameters, y, N, U, R(f),(scalars, assuming
homogeneous population) a(x), and O(x). Of particular interest
are the interdependencies among income level, total population,
and utility level. Wheaton has proposed two types of the adjust-
ment mechanism. In an open city, an exogenous shock causes in- or
out-migration so that the utility of households are maintained at
the national level wherever they live. In a closed city, utility
is endogenously determined following changes in other parameters
by the equilibrium land allocation process. While the open city
model is more in line with the classical assumption of inter-
regional equilibrium, Wheaton argues that the closed city model
may better represent the actual cities of mature economies. But,
in general, real cities would belong to some points on a con-
tinuum between these two ideal types, subject to two different
33
yet parallel adjustment processes that they represent.
For each type, Wheaton determined comparative static
effects of the above parameter changes on land consumption and
rent, as well as other endogenous parameters. The results can be
summarized as Table 1. It shows whether an endogenous variable
increases (+) or decreases (-) or remains unaffected (0) with an
increase in an exogenous variable. When both signs are shown, it
means the variable increases in some places but decreases in
others.The first line of the Table, for example, should read:
increasing income in a closed city increases utility level and
expands the city area, increases land consumption everywhere, and
decreases rent at central areas but increases it in outer areas.
Table 1. Comparative Static Adjustments
endogenous changes in
a closed city an open city
Increase U L R B N L R B
in
y + + -,+ + + - + +
a'(x) - - +,- + - + - -
R(f) - - + - - 0 0 -
N - - + +
U - + - -
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2.2 Relationships between Various Gradients
Using the above framework, we are going to investigate
time-series or cross-sectional variations in the distribution of
rent and related variables among locations. Since location is
represented by the distance from the center in the monocentric
city model, these differences are expressed by respedtive deriva-
tives with respect to distance. We will be working most of the
time with logarithmic derivatives, referred as gradients, mainly
because of their mathematical convenience.
We have seen that bid rent decreases and land consumption
per household increases with distance from the city center
(Wheaton's Theorems 2 and 3). It also means that the population
density (n), number of households per land area, decreases with
distance as the density gradient is simply the negative inverse
of that of per household land consumption
dn 1 1 1
n*(x) = -- /n =
dx dx L L
= - L'(x)/L = -L*(x) < 0 (2.5)
Also, flattening of the rent or density gradient (that is,
increase in its numerical value) over time is equivalent to the
statement that the rate of rent or density growth is higher at
farther distances, as
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d(R'(t)/R)/dx = R"(x,t)/R - R'(x)R'(t)/R
= d(R'(x)/R)/dt (2.6)
It is important to note that our use of the logarithmic
gradients does not presuppose the hypothesis contained in the so-
called exponential density function popularized by Clark and
Muth, that the density gradient is constant over all distances in
a city. Our gradients are local. Nevertheless, we can define a
city-wide gradient as the average of local gradients, and if
local rent gradients flatten at all distances, the former also
flattens; and more importantly, it means a consistent increase of
the rate of rent growth with distance.
Since households adjust their bid rent and land consumption
to compensate for the difference in commuting cost, it follows
from the definition of the compensated price elasticity of demand
L*(x) = - E(R) R*(x) (2.7.a)
where E(R) = - L'(R; U constant) R/L
is the (absolute value of) compensated
elasticity of demand for land with
respect to rent.
Likewise, when the composite good, housing, is the variable of
interest as in Muth's system,
H*(x) = - E(p) p*(x) (2.7.b)
where E(p) is the compensated elasticity of
demand for housing with respect to rental
price, p.
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Therefore, the variation in a household's expenditure on land in
the distance is given as
dLR(x)L(x)]
= R(x)L(x) [ R*(x) + L*(x) ]
dx
= R'(x)L(x) [ 1 - E(R)]
Then it follows:
LLEMMA 2.1] (a) A household spends less (same/more) on land at
farther distances from the city center if demand for land is
inelastic (unit-elastic/elastic) with respect to rent, i.e.,
d(RL)/dx = 0 iff E(R) = 1
(b) The same with housing expenditure.i.e.,
d(Hp)/dx = 0 iff E(p) = 1
The following Lemma is equivalent to the above except that
it deals with variation in housing expenditure in terms of real
purchasing power adjusted for the difference of income spendable
on consumption goods, and therefore of marginal utility of
income, rather than in nominal dollars. Note that
LRU'(Z)=L[U'(L)/U'(Z)]U'(Z)=LU'(L); and HpU'(Z)=HU'(H)
[LEMMA 2.2]
(a) d(LU'(L))/dx = 0 i ff E(^*R) = l
(b) d(HU'(H))/dx = 0
Proof.
On differentiating real term expenditures,
d[LRU'(Z)]/dx = d[LU'(L)]/dx
(2.8)
= U(L)L C R*(x) + L*(x)
+ L*(x){U"(ZL) - U"(Z)}/U'(Z)]
Constructing a bordered





Hessian of the household maximization
and denoting its determinant as D, and
U" (L,Z)









constant) = U'(Z) D(1,1)/D = U'(Z)/D
-D(l,3)/D = [ U"(ZL) - U"(Z,Z)R ]/D
or,
U"(Z,L) - U"(Z,Z)R = DL'(y) - U'(Z)L'(y)/L'(R)
= U'(Z)E(y)R/E(R)y (2.9)
Substituting this in equation (2.8)
d[LU'(L)]/dx = UI(L)LR*(x)[ 1 - E(R) - E(y)RL/y ]
= U'(Z)LR'(x) [ 1 - E(^R) ]
by the Slutsky equation.
i ff E(p =l
Noting R'(x)<O completes the proof. Likewise for (b).
Q.E.D.
How we should interpret these Lemmas to bear upon the empi-
rical world depends on values of the relevant price elasticities.
Fortunately, price elasticity of housing demand has been extensi-
vely studied by many, and the wide difference in earlier esti-
mates has been reduced to a small range in recent studies.
Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) obtained the elasticity estimate
between 0.67 and 0.72 using a carefully constructed estimation
method and set of data on the U.S. housing market. They also
showed that earlier estimates are brought close to the range once
corrected for various biases. Another study with a set of
controlled experimental data produced an estimate of the long-
term elasticity a little below this range, though with a wider
confidence interval, and the short-term elasticity much smaller.
(Quigley and Hanushek, 1980) These and other recent estimates
appear to leave little doubt about the inelasticity of housing
demand with respect to price.
The question remains, though, whether the estimate is of
the compensated (Hicksian) elasticity or the ordinary (Marshal-
lian) one. If income is taken account of using a data set for one
city and time, utility can be considered controlled for and the
measured elasticity would be a compensated one. But the study by
Polinsky and Ellwood used a national pooled sample, and the
second study used longitudinal data for individual cities estima-
tion. Therefore, Polinsky and Ellwood's estimate may probably
fall between true values of compensated and ordinary elastici-
ties. Even if the estimated value of 0.7 is close to the true
compensated elasticity, the small income elasticity (around 0.5
in their estimation and less than 1 according to most studies)
suggests that the ordinary elasticity would not exceed 1 (by the
Slutsky equation. See the proof of Lemma 2.2.) Also, based on
available information on housing consumption in countries other
than the U.S. (for example, Lluch and Powell, 1977; and Follain,
et al., 1980), the inelasticity of housing demand with respect to
rental price appears to be a general phenomenon.
A strong case for inelasticity of demand for land can be
derived from these evidences through the following Hicks-Allen
formulation for derived demand, assuming a competitive factor
market and elastic supply of structural inputs.
E(R) = ( 1 - K )E(p) + sK
where K is the factor income share of
structural input in housing, and
s is elasticity of substitution between
land and structure in housing production.
The pair of compensated elasticities in this equation can
be substituted by the ordinary ones. The most widely used value
for the substitution elasticity is 0.5, as estimated by Muth
(1972), and no other study puts the value over one (McDonald
1980). These inelasticities of both housing demand and substi-
tution imply, as apparent from the above equation, that the
demand for land must also be inelastic regardless of the factor
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shares. Using probable values -- E(p) = .5, s = .5, and K =.7 --
yields an estimate of .5 for E(R). This agrees well with more
direct estimates by several researchers (0.35 to 0.7 according to
Witte, 1977, and Sirmans and Redman, 1979)
On the strength of these evidences, we can restate the
Lemmas into the following propositions which will be used repeat-
edly throughout this thesis. Note that the Cobb-Douglas utility
or production function assumes the ordinary demand or substitu-
tion elasticity of 1 which is larger than the empirical studies
suggest, but is still compatible with the two Propositions except
that LU'(L) would also stay constant for all distances.
[PROPOSITION 2.1] In a monocentric city, (a) land or (b) housing
expenditure per identical household decreases with distance from
the city center, i.e.,
(a) dRL/dx < 0 ; and (b) dHp/dx < 0
[PROPOSITION 2.2] In a monocentric city, (a) real term expendi-
ture on land per household decreases with distance; and
(b) real term housing expenditure does not increase with
distance, i.e.,
(a) d[LU'(L)]/dx < 0 ; and (b) d[HU'(H)]/dx < 0
Lastly, we can infer a simple relationship between gra-
dients of rent and density by combining equations (2.5) and
(2.7.a)
n*(x) = E(R)R*(x)
Inelasticity of demand for land will make the density gradient
flatter than the rent gradient. The relationship between changes
in the two gradients can also be inferred directly by differen-
tiating the above
dn*(x) = E(R) dR*(x) + R*(x)dE(R)
Below we shall see that R*(x) increases when the level of rent,
R, increases generally. Then, by the Le Chatelier principle, the
price elasticity decreases. In other words, the two terms in the
above equation move in the same direction. Thus,
[PROPOSITION 2.3] The population density gradient increases or
decreases as the rent gradient increases or decreases.i.e.
sign(dn*(x)) = sign(dR*(x))
2.3 Spatial Pattern of Land Rent
and Population Density Changes
The foregoing provides us with the basis for determining
the change in the rent gradient and hence the density gradient
resulting from a change in some aggregate parameter of a city.
Particularly, we are interested in differences of land rent
growth rates among locations in a growing city. As discussed
above, a flattening rent gradient would mean that rent grows
faster at a farther location.
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(2.10)
Urban growth means in the foremost sense an increase in
population size or in the residents' income level. In an open
city, the two go together, as population is increased in response
to growing income so that the utility level is equalized. As
Wheaton has shown, the growth expands total area of the city and
increases land rent and land use density everywhere. Since
dR/dy = R'(y) = l/L , by Theorem 3 of Wheaton.
Changes in the gradient are obtained by differentiating the above:
d dR d 1
-(-) = -(-) = - R*(x)[ 1 - E(R)]/RL > 0
dx Rdy dx RL
by Proposition 2.1. Thus,
[PROPOSITION 2.4] An increase in population and household
income in an open city flattens rent and density gradients
Another obvious measure of urban size is the physical
expanse of the city. For a given terrain, population increase
will result in physical expansion. This can also result from an
improved transportation system. Let us first restate the relevant
Theorems of Wheaton's which are limited to transportatin cost
that is linear in distance with a general cost function
x
a(x) = a'(x')dx' a'(x') > 0 for all x'. (2.9.a)
0
A reduction of the total transport cost due to some
improvement (I) will increase rent and density as
da (x)
R'(I;x) = - > 0 ; L'(I;x) = R'(I;x)L'(R) < 0
L dI
(2.9.b)
But reduction in the marginal transport cost would generally be
uneven. It is quite common in growing cities that congestion
increases transportation cost in inner parts of the commuting
route while expanding car ownership and highways reduce the cost
in outlying areas. The impact of transportation investments on
rent gradient must be evaluated considering these conflicting
factors.
dR*(x) da'(x) da(x) 2
= - -- a'(x)-[ 1 - E(R) ]/(RL)
dI RL dI dI
(2.10)
da'(x) da(x) a(x)
= R*(x){ + [I - E(R)] }
a'(x)dI a(x)dI RL
Since the expenditure on land would at least be comparable to
that on transportation and hence RL/a(x)[l-E(R)] would be large,
this equation tells us that
[PROPOSITION 2.5] (a) When either the total or marginal transpor-
tation cost is reduced and neither is increased, the rent and
density would increase and their gradients would flatten.
(b) The local gradient would flatten as long as the marginal cost
is reduced, provided that the total cost is not increased at a
much higher rate than the rate of reduction in marginal cost.
The effects of income increase and transportation impro-
44
vement in a closed city have been determined by Wheaton and can
be summarized as follows.
[PROPOSITION 2.6] An increase in income or transportation effi-
ciency in a closed city would lower rents in central areas,
raise them in outer areas, and hence flatten the gradient.
The logic behind this proposition can be informally
explained as the following. First, from Wheaton's Theorem 4, we
know that the marginal utility of income, U'(Z), increases with
distance. Since the dollar amount of income increases are the
same over all distances, this will shift the demand for locations
in favor of outer areas, thus flattening gradients. In central
parts of the city, even with the same demand for land, the least
one can do with the additional income is to spend it all on the
composite good so that dy = dZ. Actually, a better use of the
money is possible, so dU > U'(Z)dy. Therefore,




The effects of transportation improvement can be evaluated
in the same manner, for a reduction in transportation cost
effectively increases income spendable on goods. The flattening
of rent gradient will be even more obvious because the cost
saving also increases with distance.
Sometimes the utility level of residents is said to
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increase with urban growth. But this will be the result of some
other growth impetus in a closed city as we have seen just above,
and the utility increase cannot be considered an independent
cause of urban growth. In fact, for an open city, an increase in
an exogenous level of utility can be seen as a cause of decline
in urban size, as outmigration must occur in-order that the city
residents' consumption and utility be increased. By Wheaton's
Theorem 3,
R'(U) = - 1/LU'(Z) < 0 ; L'(U) = R'(U)L'(R) > 0
As the rent at the border rent is reduced as is everywhere, the
border is pushed in; increased land consumption and reduced city
size combine to decrease the total population. Its effect on rent
gradient follows directly from Proposition 2.2.
d R'(U) d 1
-- = -- ] < 0 as R =U'(L)/U'(Z)
dx R dx LU'(L)
This effect for an open city can be considered a partial
effect of induced utility change in the case of a closed city:
[PROPOSITION 2.7] Increasing utility, exogenous for an open city
and endogenous for a closed city, will reduce rent and steepen
its gradient everywhere and will reduce the city area and
population.
For a closed city, growth in population alone causes a drop
in utility level as Wheaton has shown. No other parameter of
consumption changes, so the net effect is exactly opposite to the
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above Proposition. Namely,
[PROPOSITION 2.8] Population increase in a closed city would
expand the city, raise rent and flatten its gradient everywhere.
The effect of utility difference on urban spatial structure
enables us to consider the impacts of various direct constraints
on the physical growth of cities. These include economic ones
such as higher farm rent, natural ones such as water and steep
hills, and legal ones such as the greenbelt and other prohibitive
regulations.
It has already been shown by Wheaton that higher farm rent
would decrease utility. Then, Proposition 2.6 makes clear that it
will result in higher rent and flattened rent gradient everywhere.
Some growth control measures like the greenbelt can be seen
as a legal limit to the city border superseding the market
condition of border (equation (2.3)). By differentiating the
condition that the size of population does not change in a closed
city (equation (2.4)), and rearranging,
dU/dB = - N'(B)/ N'(U) > 0
as N'(B) = l(B)B/L(B) > 0 ; and
N'(U) < 0 by Proposition 2.6.
Therefore, an extended legal border, if it supersedes the border
determined by market competition between urban and rural sectors,
will make the rent gradient steeper. Conversely, a regulatory or
physical limitation on urban area would flatten the gradient.
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Sometimes the limitations do not present themselves at the
outer edge encircling the city but start right from the city
center located alongside a limiting feature such as waterfront or
steep hills. This case can be simplified as a reduced arch (d) of
a semicircle and can be analyzed in a similar manner. It is
fairly obvious that utility would decrease as a result, but the
proof is provided for the sake of completeness. Differentiating
the border condition,
dR(B) dB dU





Substituting this in the condition dN = 0 and rearranging,
dU 2 B 2 B R'(U;B)
- = N/0 { [xL'(U)/L ]dx + -- } > 0
d# 0 L(B) R'(x;B)
as L'(U) > 0 , R'(U) < 0 , and R'(x) < 0
Therefore, dB/d# > 0 , and by Proposition 2.5, dR*(x)/d4 > 0
Note that all these constraints would change the aggregate
size of an open city but would not change any of the consumption
parameters - namely, utility, income, and transportation cost -
and hence leave the rent and land consumption unchanged. In sum,
[PROPOSITION 2.9] Restraints on urban physical growth by zoning,
terrain, or high farm rent would raise rent and density and
flatten the gradients everywhere in a closed city. They will
decrease the physical size and population but wi-ll not change the
spatial structure of an open city.
Apparently this Proposition would be useful mainly for
cross-sectional comparisons, and would have little to do with
growth impacts in themselves. It is interesting to note that the
smaller in area a closed city is forced to become by these limi-
tations, the flatter the rent gradient is; whereas the larger the
city becomes by growth in population.and the like, the flatter
the gradient becomes.
In conclusion, we can say very generally that urban growth
flattens the rent gradient and hence the population density
gradient, as every important aspect of growth - in population,
income, and transportation system - results in the flattening of
the gradients. However, urban growth is sometimes ambiguous. It
is not very rare that a city grows in one aspect but declines in
another as in some metropolitan areas of the U.S. where popula-
tion declined while income level continued to grow. But in most
of these cities income growth clearly dominated the population
decrease which was neither consistent or substantial. The last
Proposition also introduces uncertainty to our conclusion. Some
aspects of urban expansion can be likened to a removal of
limiting factors: for example, advances in civil engineering
equipments such as tractors and bulldozers can open up areas
previously left in unbuildable condition for new urban use. This
kind of expansion would in the first sense be a result of growth
in other basic measures but it would partially offset the trend
toward flattening gradient.
2.4 Spatial Pattern of Land Value Changes
The last section makes it clear that urban rent increases
at a faster rate in areas more distant from the city center when
the monocentric city grows in any basic measure of city size -
population, income level, transportation efficiency, and hence
physical area. If the city is reduced in size, the opposite
happens: rent at a more distant location declines faster. In
order to transtlate this pattern into that of land value, the
price for a permanent or other long-term title to the rent
stream, we need to consider conditions of equilibrium in the
capital asset market.
In a competitive capital market, a prospective landowner
would be indifferent between owning a piece of land or other
asset if the return from the land, rent plus the capital gain, is
expected to equal the opportunity cost of capital
r(t)V(t) = R(t) + V'(t) (2.11)
where r(t) is the rate of return for
alternative investments
V(t) is the land value at the start
of period t
V'(t) = V(t+dt) - V(t) is the increase
in land value
R(t) is the present period rent
receivable at the end of the period
Rewriting this equation we obtain the following expression for
the land value appreciation rate, g, as the difference between
discount rate and rent-value ratio.
g = V*(t) = r - R/V (2.12)
This two-period equilibrium implies the following multi-
period equation for capitalization of rent stream, which is
considered the definition of value.
T t'
V(t) = R(tI) exp[ - 5r(u)du] dt' (2.13.a)
The end period, T, is infinity for the ordinary value of land.
Some finite future time, independent of the starting period, can
be assigned to it without invalidating the analyses below. The
usual capitalization formula. is a simplification of the above,
with the assumption of a constant discount rate, i.e.,
0o
V(t) = 5 R(t') exp[-r(t'- t)] dt' (2.13.b)
Land value declines with distance as long as the present or
the future rent doese
V'(x;t) =5R'(x;t') exp[-r(t'-t)] dt' (2.14)
t
A similar expression can be given to the land value change
over time. The capitalization equation (2.13.b) can be integrated
by parts to yield
R(t) l T
V(t) = .- - + - R'(t') exp[- r(t'- t)]dt'
r r t
Comparing this with equation (2.11), we obtain the expression of
change in value as the present value of the stream of rent changes.
V'(t) = R'(t') exp[-r(t'- t)] dt (2.15)
/t
Note that we can define derivatives of rent, though it may not be
a continuous function in time or distance, as long as the varia-
tions are bounded. (By Lebesgue's Theorem: See Riesz and Sz.-
Nagy, 1954.)
Juxtaposing definitions of land value and its change, we have:
[LEMMA 3] If the discount rate remains constant throughout time,
the rate of land value appreciation is an average of future rent




- SR*(.t')R(t') exp[ . ] dt' / R(t') exp[ . ] dt'
/t t
A critical problem with the above analysis of land value
change lies in the fact that land value is based on expected
future rents and discount rates, although the value itself is a
present quantity as are the present rent and discount rate. The
speculative element of it is all contained in the capital gain,
and the relationships above hold only with the expected gains
which could well be different from actual gains. How the real
events correspond to expectations and how expectations are formed
and work in people's mind are fundamental questions that are far
from any satisfactory resolution and that distinguish different
models of capital market behaviour. Any elaborate study of this
subject is beyond the scope of this thesis and we will only
consider two simplest models.
A frequently employed simple model, the myopic foresight
model, assumes that people behave as if the future would be just
like today. Rents are expected to be constant throughout the
future, and capital gains are not expected. Then, from (2.11)
V(t) = R(t)/r or R/V = r (2.17.a)
And the gradients of land value and rent are the same
R'(x) R
V*(x) = = R*(x) (2.17.b)
r r
Although people expect no capital gains, the next day may prove
them wrong. An increase in rent already taken place has to be
accomodated, and the land value will rise to bring the rent-value
ratio back to r. Therefore, ex post,
V*(t) = R*(t) (2.17.c)
The value appreciation rate would increase with distance but
fall to zero beyond the border just as the rate of rent growth.
Under the Usual circumstances of continued economic
changes, however, this model is clearly implausible for it
implies that landowners reap excess return on their land every-
time the rent increases or suffer loss everytime it decreases,
no matter - how repeatedly it happens. Alternative models of
expectations are based on the fact that substantial if noisy
information is available for prediction of the future, and
people use it. The hypothesis of rational expectations states
that the resulting prediction is on average about as good as
the prediction of relevant economic thepries (John Muth, 1961).
At a further extreme is the perfect foresight model which
simply assumes that people know all relevant future events
exactly and certainly. But many rational expectation models are
in effect equivalent to this extreme model as the market pro-
cesses are modeled in such a way that real events turn out to
match people's prior expectations in probabilistic terms. In
other words, real events seldom surprise people so seriously as
to force a change in their behaviour while surprise always
occurs but never induces people to change their behaviour under
the myopic expectations model.
Both are of course extreme and unrealistic. Nevertheless,
it appears to be the better strategy to concentrate on the
perfect a model of perfect foresight or simple rational expec-
tations for two reasons. First, substantial rationality of
people's expectations is probabably indicated by the healthy
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existence of active capital markets, past studies of firms'
expectations and dynamic adjustments, etc. Second, as far as
the expectations are concerned, the myopic foresight model can
be regarded as a special or degenerate case of the perfect
foresight model in the sense that the unchanging future is one
of many possible course of the future. So the former can be
easily derived as a special case if we analyze the case of the
latter, more general pattern of expectations.
In the land market of the growing city, what would
rational expectations would entail? We suppose that people are
aware of the trend of flattening rent gradient and the expec-
tations are stable. Further, the expected path of urban growth
could be characterized as monotonic i.e., people would expect
fluctuations but the long-term projection would be a continua-
tion of the trend in one direction. Then the actual rate of
growth of land value is the same as the mean of expected ones
given by the equation (2.12). Its variation among locations is
obtained by differentiating the same equation.
dV*(t;x) dR(xt) dV 2
+ - R/V
dx V dx dx
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Inside the border, the present rent gradient, R*(x:t), is
negative. Further, since the rent gradient is expected to
flatten over time,
R*(x;t) R(xt') < R*(x;t') R(x,t') = R'(x;t')
for t'> t
Therefore, in equation (2.19) the first term in the brackets
is larger than the absolute value of the second. Hence
dV*(t;x)/dx > 0 for x < B
That is, the rate of appreciation is higher as the distance
from the center is increased toward the border.
Beyond the border, the farm rent does not vary over
distance but land value gradient is negative as the land is
expected to begin earning urban rent at some future time
(equation (2.14)) . Then the first term in equation (2.19) is
zero and the second term is negative, hence
dV*(t;x) < 0 for x > B .
i.e., the rate of appreciation decreases with distance from the
boundary away from the city center. The slope of the rate of
appreciation in distance would exhibit a sharp edge at the
border because the rent gradient is negative just inside the
border, and zero just outside it. (Of course, there would be a
certain point far outside the city limit beyond which urban
use is not expected for a foreseeable future and the gradients
of rent, value and the value appreciation rate remain flat.)
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The following Proposition and Figure 1 summarize the
above analysis of spatial distribution of the land value
appreciation rate.
[PROPOSITION 2.10] The rate of land value appreciation
increases with distance from the center in a growing monocen-
tric city up to the border. Beyond the border, it falls sharply
to zero under myopic expectations but falls gradually to zero
under rational expectations.
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assumed that the discount rate remains











ith economic fluctuations, especially in developing
and risk and the property tax rate which make up the
of the total effective discount rate change substan-
h time and location.
the inflation rate does not constitute a separate
as long as it is accounted for in a consistent way.
if rent is expressed in current market dollars, it
discounted by the nominal rate; if rent is in constant
the real rate should be used. The two methods yield
capitalization since the real rate is by definition
the nominal rate less the inflation rate.
It is now firmly established that uncertainty is compen-
sated by a higher rate of return. It is axiomatic that, other
things being equal, people feel more uncertain about events of
a distant future than an immediate future. Where the rent and
hence value is growing fast, the future rents carry more weight
(in calculating the harmonic mean of the discount rate) rela-
tive to the present rent than is the case when the rent and
value are growing slowly. Consequently, the faster growing land
value is affected more by periods over which uncertainty is
relatively high, and hence it incorporates higher overall
uncertainty. Uncertainty would affect the whole city as well in
times of economic flux, but again it will be more pronounced
for lands whose value depends heavily upon expectations far
into the future.
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A tax levied as a percentage of the value of a property
in effect raises the discount factor, as the land should yield
not only the market interest but also the ad valorem tax on
property value. With a tax rate, w, the equilibrium relation
between land value,- rent. and capital gain can be expressed,
(i + w)V(t) = R(t) + V'(t)
where i is the market interest rate.
This translates into a capitalization formula with (i+w) the
applicable discount rate.
Let us now evaluate how the total effective discount rate
affects the land value by differentiating the capitalization
equation, assuming rent is independent of the discount rate
dV (t)
=
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In other words, an increase of the discount rate reduces the
level of the land value, more severely in faster growing areas.
Also, the growth rate itself would be affected by the discount
rate change as apparent from equation (2.12), which says that
the appreciation rate is the difference between the discount
rate and the rent-value ratio. Some draw an inference that a
higher discount rate causes faster appreciation, neglecting the
rent-value ratio which should change with the discount rate
(for example, Vining and Hiraguchi, 1977). Some others consider
the latter effect but reach the same conclusion on the basis of
a few specific time paths of rent (see Walters, 1978). But it
seems an haste to make a generalization from such a partial
analysis. Differentiating equation (2.12),
dg dV*(t) d
-- = = -(r - R/V)
dr dr dr
dV 2
=1 + R- /V
dr
= 1 - (r - g)/(r - G) (2.21)
from (2.12) and (2.20).
Therefore, the effects of the change in the discount rate on
the level and appreciation of land value can be summarized as
[LEMMA 4] (a) An increase in the discount rate will reduce land
value proportionately more in areas where future land value is
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expected to appreciate faster:
V*(r) = - l/(r - G)
(b) An increase in the discount rate will raise the apprecia-
tion rate if the present appreciation rate (g) is higher than
the average future appreciation rate (G), reduce it otherwise:
dV*(t)/dr = (g -'G)/(r - G)
To evaluate this Lemma adequately,
average of future growth ratea of value,
comparison with the present growth rate of
the average of future growth rates of rent
From equations (2.15) and (2.20.a), we can
we need to know the
G, particularly in




That is, G can also be called an average of future rent growth
rates just as g is, but with heavier weights assigned to more
distant futures than in the case of g. Conversely, rent growth
in the immediate future becomes less important in evaluating G.
Unfortunately, we cannot derive from this many explicit
insights about the relationship between the two average rates
without assuming a certain time path of rent. However, several
points are easily read from the above expression.
First, when rent is expected to grow at a constant (or
zero) rate, value is also expected to grow at the same rate and
hence the discount rate does not affect the appreciation rate
-rt'I - rt'
dt'/ Tt 'R(t') eG(0) = Tt 'R*(t') RWt) e
(as g = G). Second, the two average rates would move together
among locations within the monotonically growing city as in
general the future growth will be faster in areas growing
faster at the present. Therefore, land value in outer areas
would be more sensitive to discount rate changes. Third,
however, difference in G would be proportionately smaller than
that in g because the rent gradient grows flatter and hence
differences in the rent growth rate would in general become
smaller as time goes by.
The second and the third points leave it difficult to
define the relative impact of the discount rate on the appre-
ciation rate. However, it is clear that G is likely to be
larger than g in areas awaiting urban development in the near
future because the zero growth of farm rent before urbanization
would be given less weight in calcualting G than in g.
Therefore, higher uncertainty and hence a higher discount rate
applicable for those areas would make the pace of appreciation
slower than under a risk-free rate.
These implications, particularly the last one, contradict
the conventional wisdom that argues for appreciation rates in-
creasing with the discount rate, particularly in the suburban
area. This argument seems to be an empirical generalization of
the frequently observed association between high rates of
discount and appreciation but analytically it neglects the
effect of the discount rate on the rent-value ratio. But we
have shown that fringe area land values would appreciate faster
without or despite the high uncertainty and discount rate. This
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is not to deny the influence of the discount rate which
obviously varies over time and locations, but its impact should
probably be understood in ways opposite to the conventional
reasoning.
Changes in market interest rates are usually exogenous to
a city. Locally, uncertainty would be reduced and land values
raised in general as the city matures and the simple passage of
time improves information. Capital gains resulting from these
general influence would be higher in outer areas because the
inherently faster rate of rent growth would make the value more
sensitive to changes in the discount rate.
An abnormally high risk or interest rate should not be
regarded as a permanent feature that causes rapid appreciation
in itself but as a transient feature of a particular area or
period which is liable to relatively quick abatement. If it is
abated, high capital gains result, that is apparently an abnor-
mally fast appreciatiation but is essentially an one-time
occurrence. The reduction in uncertainty is also likely to
cause acceleration of appreciation in suburban land markets but
this shift is not general, and some other areas may experience
a slowing down of appreciation. At any rate, this is probably
not as important an aspect of land value changes resulting from
variations of the discount rate when compared with the one-time
change in land value level itself also resulting from
variations in the discount rate.
Chapter 3. LAND VALUE and USE with DURABLE HOUSING
3.1 Defining Value of Land for Durable Use
In the last chapter we have assumed that land use is
adjustable without cost or delay and that land rent is uniquely
determined for a given location and time. But, in reality, urban
land is used in combination with structures that are extremely
durable and can be changed only at very high costs. In this
situation, although the rental price of a land use property as a
whole (in our case, housing) is determined by the market as
usual, land rent is not observed as a market variable. Nor can
rent be derived from the former through the marginal value pro-
duct rule because the input combination of land and strucuture at
a particular moment cannnot be and usually is not adjusted to be
optimal as the marginal value rules would prescribe under
presently prevailing market parameters.
This apparently causes a lot of problems in defining and
analyzing urban land value and use. In this section we will
examine essential elements of the concept of land value under
conditions of durable land use. It is in a large measure redun-
dant since rules of land valuation with or without durable inputs
have been known all along under the name of "the best and highest
use principle". Nevertheless, it is felt necessary to clarify the
basic conceptual issues because understanding of market pricing
is always a crucial step in analyzing any resource allocation
problem and because the known principles are, or became, vague
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as persitent confusion in literature attests.
Let us define what is the quality that we call "durabi-
lity" that calls for special analytical treatment. First of
all, it is important to distinguish between technical durability
meaning that a good does not wear off easily, and economic dur-
ability meaning that a particular good or a part of it is not
easily disposed of. Capital goods are durable in the sense that
it is uneconomical to disengage any factor in use and transfer it
to another situation even when the existing combination of the
factors is not optimal in view of the current market conditions.
It is uneconomical in the sense that the factor loses
most of its value if transferred. Staying put, its value may be
less than what it would command as the original resource but more
than its value in any other use. It is this economic inflexibil-
ity that constrains the optimization problem and renders the
comparative static analysis inadequate. Physical durability is
usually a necessary condition but is not a sufficient one. An
irrigation pump, for example, is very durable, and it is just as
valuable even if it is transferred to another place or to another
purpose. Thus the one-period cost of the pump is well defined as
the hire price covering the interest and depreciation on its one-
time purchase price. This type of flexible combinations of
physically durable factors can be handled adequately within a
comparative static framework, although the production of the
durable factor itself may call for a different framework.
On the other hand, most urban land use structures once
committed to a property are of little use for any other purposes.
Structural members of a new single story house are practically of
no value for any other building and only marginally valuable
even for on-site redevelopment such as building a two story
house at the same place. Marginal adaptations of existing struc-
tures can usually be made without great loss of efficiency, but
only within a narrow limit.
What is the consequence of introducing this quality, the
economic durability or inflexibility of a particular land use, in
the analysis of urban housing and land market ?
From the consumer's point of view, durability means that
an available house comes with predetermined proportions of compo-
nent factors, land and structure, probably different from those
that he would have liked if he were free to assemble his own or
to make any marginal modifications, adding or deleting portions
of land and structure. However, he is not allowed such choices,
but only the choice of this or that prepackage called a house. As
a consequence, the price for each factor is not relevant to his
choice of residence, only the rental price of the whole house is.
Under certain restrictions implicit (hedonic) prices can be
assigned to attributes of the house, but such prices in general
have only tenuous relationships with the overt market.
From the housing producer's point of view, separate and
implicit price for each input factor is again irrelevant for his
supply decisions. Further, rental income from a house for each
period cannot dictate his production decision in isolation from
revenues and costs incurred in other periods. Breaking up the
problem into that of multi-factor production and that of multi-
period production, let us first consider the derivation of static
land rent and value when land is considered an input to housing
production instead of a separate consumption good as in the last
chapter.
When most input factors for land use are essentially
perishable as in agriculture, one-period land rent is defined as
the maximum surplus of revenue from the land use over the cost of
non-land inputs so that the zero profit condition is maintained.
That some inputs are physically durable does not necessarily
cause any problem in defining the rent as we have seen in the
example of an irrigation pump. This is the essence of the assump-
tion of malleability in comparative static analysis of urban land
use. It is assumed that parts' of a structure can be rearranged
and moved to another place as to befit whatever the prevailing
market condition dictates without cost of such adjustments or
loss of their value as fresh input factors. The housing producer
can essentially hire these inputs period by period at the cost of
depreciation and interest. On the other side of the ledger, his
revenue is also well defined by the market demand for housing.
Thus the housing producer tries to optimize the input combina-
tion to maximize the surplus of the current revenue over current
cost, which is defined as the land rent. Formally, following the
discussion in section 2.1 on Muth's framework of urban housing
market analysis,
max R = max (pH(h,L) - rch)/L
h,L
67
where h is the housing structure used by a household, and land
(L) and housing (H) are also expressed in amounts per household.
C is the marginal one-time purchase price of the structural
input; r is the discount rate applicable to the cost of
structure, including interest and depreciation rates.
- If the returns to scale is not constant, the producer
would have also to decide how many of these houses to build. In
case the housing is produced by a constant returns to scale
technology, we can write the production function in the density
form, with the structural density as the sole argument:
Q = Q(k) with Q = nH and k = nh
where Q is the quantity of housing per land area, or housing
density; k is the amount Qf the structural input per land area,
or structural density; and n is the number of households per
area.
The assumption of constant returns to scale in housing
production is of course a very common one and also has proven to
be a good empirical approximation. This in combination with the
assumption of weak separability of preference for housing (see
section 2.1) implies homotheticity of subutility function in
housing input factors. Though certain homothetic utility functons
are found to be empirically untrue, a wide variety of utility
functions can be specified within the restrictions of homotheti-
city, closely approximating acutal consumption behaviour.
However, in order for this implication of homotheticity not to
degenerate into homogeneity of utility function, which is too
restrictive, we should be careful to specify that marginal rental
of housing is dependent on the size of a household's dwelling
unit, i.e.
p = p(H,y,U)
where p is the marginal rental price of housing.
With this precaution, we will employ the assumption of
the constant returns to scale production function expressed in
density form throught the remainder of this thesis. Then the
housing producer's maximization problem and the first order
condition can be written
R = max{pQ - rck}
H,k (3.1)
pQ'(k) = rc (3.2.a)
In case the producer wants to make an adjustment to
existing housing, the standing structure can be rearranged appro-
priately without cost, as long as the cost of additional input is
justified by the additional revenue, i.e.
p[Q - q] = rck' (3.2.b)
where q is the existing quantity of housing per area, and k' is
the additional structural input.
The last discussion provides a point of departure for
the complications involved in situations where land use is
durable and the costless adjustment is ruled out. Under durabi-
lity, if a housing is built so as to maximize the current profit,
or rent as defined in equation (3.1), it will turn out to be an
inefficient land use when housing rental or input cost changes.
This type of inefficiency cannot be totally avoided as long as
adjustment is costly, but the developer must seek to maximize the
efficiency of resource use for the entire life of the housing by
making a long-term plan based on the expectation of the future.
Since a short-term maximization problem is no longer relevant,
short-term rent is not the primary concern to the developer. Land
value is the objective variable to maximize, and it is defined as
the surplus of the stream of revenue over cost from the best
possible programmme of land use over all future periods:
V(t(O))
T(i) -r(t'-t(0))
= supra ! [P(t',i) - c(t')k(t',i)]e dt'
i )t(i)
(3.3.a)
where P(t!,i) is the net rental income per land area at time t',
from land use i that is established at timet( and replaced at
time T(i); k(t',i) is the durable input added at time t' to the
land use i ; c(t') is the unit purchase price of the durable
input; and T(i) is the end period when the housing built at time
t(i) will be replaced.
Alternatively, denoting the profit for the i th phase of develop-
ment or the leasehold value of land for the life of a housing
built at time t(i) as A(i),
V(t(O)) = A(i)e
(3.3.b)
-r (t (1) -t (0))
= A(O) + V(t(l))e
This definition of land value is not easy to apply in
practice because the future is difficult to foresee and the
market for land is usually very thin. But at least conceptually
it is straightforward enough as long as land is not being
occupied for a durable use. A good deal of confusion persists,
however, about correct evaluation of land already being used for
housing or other urban purposes. Land is often mistakenly evalu-
ated on the basis of existing use. But the critical point is that
land value is based on the optimal land use programme beginning
from the current period and the above definition should be
applied regardless of the existing use.
In general, every input factor used to produce a durable
real asset loses not only some of its original value as a reso-
urce but also its separate economic identity, so that it is
irrelevant to evaluate individual inputs. But real estate is an
exception, for land can always be used as any open land after the
previous building is swept away: it makes no difference to a new
development whether or not there used be a building on the land.
On the other hand, material and labor inputs for construction
become completely sunk in the particular land use and cannot be
transferred, as illustrated in the above example.
mean they have no economic value. Obviously, a
usually more valuable with a building on the site
it. But, in principle, the value of a real estate
by summing the discounted future incomes from the
whole, not separate values of structure and land,
latter approach is often taken in practice. Value
ture is determined as the remainder of this value










definable at the opportunity cost as an unused resource.
It appears inconsistent that different evaluation rules
are applied to the two factors of the same final product. Indeed,
values of both factors should be derived by the same principle
from the value of the property to be built, but only at the time
of its construction. After the construction, the rental price of
the particular property is the only relevant and determinate
price in the market for the final product, housing. The produc-
tion is already completed and the factor costs are no longer
relevant in determining the availability and consumption of the
existing house. But the owner should decide whether to keep
operating it as a housing, to renovate it, or to sell it to a
producer (possibly himself) as a factor of production for a new
housing or another kind of real estate.
Since the durability renders the structural members
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unusable as materials for new development, the value of the
latter option consists solely of the value of land which is
reusable. In other words, land value enters the land use decision
problem as a reference to the value of complete redevelopment.
This role of the land market in resource allocation requires that
land value not be dependent upon the existing use but solely upon
the best possible future use-. Therefore at any time land value
should be defined by the optimal programme of land use starting
from that moment as specified in equation (3.3). When this value
of land exceeds that of the existing house as a whole, it is time
to replace it with a new building. In other words, the value of
existing structure defined as the remainder expresses the value
of keeping the structure over that of razing it and building anew
in its stead.
Correct evaluation itself is not inherently more or less
difficult with durable land use than with malleable use. But
durability poses a serious problem in analyzing variations of
land value with respect to time or location because the discrete
series of land use successions contained in the definition of
land value resists classical techniques of analysis. The prefer-
red solution by economists to this problem is simply to assume it
away in various ways. Let us briefly examine implications of a
few widely adopted simplifications.
In most empirical studies of housing production, land
value at the time of new housing development is considered the
true resource cost of land for housing. But the leasehold value
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is the true measure of the latter, and it would be smaller than
the full market value of land which includes the land value
retrievable when the housing is eventually replaced (Refer to
equation (3.3.b)). The simplification would be harmless for com-
paring different land values if the life-span of the projected
land use and the discount rate are large enough so that the end-
period value would be negligible or if the project life-span and
the land value appreciation rate are the same for different
developments. But these assumptions contain substantial errors
about urban housing and land markets as we shall see in the next
chapter.
In modeling dynamics of land use, assuming myopic
expectations on the part of developers eliminates the analytical
problem. If developers expect no change in market parameters,
they will try to maximize (perceived) land value on the basis of
the present rental income which is expected to be received in
perpetuity. Hence,
V(t:myopic) = max{p(t)Q(t)/r - c(t)k(t)} (3.4.a)
k
or
R(myopic) = max{pQ - rck}
k (3.4.b)
where V(myopic) = R(myopic)/r
Comparing these with equations (2.17) and (3.1) we can see that
the analytic situation reverts to the static one under myopic
expectations, with the difference that land use change cannot
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happen as easily as with the malleable structure. We have argued
in section 2.4 that market agents' expectations are probably a
lot more sophisticated than that, especially if market conditions
change recurrently and substantially. Besides, we shall see later
that analytical simplicity gained by the restrictive assumption
is largely illusionary.
Sometimes it is assumed that land use never changes once
it is put in place. This may or may not be a reasonable empirical
approximation of urban land use. At any rate, however, we cannot
discuss the land value of built-up areas under the no-change
assumption, as we have seen that possibility of land use change
is the only reason why land value is relevant and determinate for
already urbanized areas.
Obviously these are attempts to get around the un-
wieldiness of the full and correct definition of land value.
Analysis is made difficult because the land use decision for
every discrete stage and period is dependent not only on current
parameters but also upon those of every period of the relevant
future. The difficulties would be avoided without resorting to
one of the above unsatisfactory simplifications if we can define
opportunity cost, or rent, of land for each short period. But it
is even more unacceptable to define it, as often done, by refer-
ence to the existing use. We will find in the following section
an appropriate definition of the shadow rent for each period
unencumbered by the above compromises. But before we get such a
definition it is necessary to spell out implications of the land
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market on optimal urban land use.
3.2 Rules of Optimal Land Use and Shadow Rent
We have seen above that land value is determined and
used chiefly to decide whether to keep or replace the existing
land use. The decision for a property owner is choosing the right
time, t*, to replace the existing use to maximize his income, the
sum of discounted rental income from the present use and land




max J(0) = P(t',-) e dt' + V(t*) e (3.5)
t* 0
where P(t',-) is rental income derived from the
existing land use, net of
current cost at time t'.
This yields the first order condition
exp[-rt*] = 0 ; or
P(t,-) - rV(t*) + V'(t*) = 0 (3.6)
In other words, the owner should keep the property indefinitely,
or replace it when current income is no more than the opportunity
capital cost 'of land value gained by waiting one more period.
Current rental income P(t*,-) is farm rent, R(f), for conversion
of land from farm to urban use; or housing rental p(t*)q(t*) for
redevelopment of built-up land, where p is the rental price of









On the other side of the ledger, the housing developer
the value of land on the basis of the optimal use pos-
the time. His maximization problem is expressed by the
n of land value itself, equation (3.3). We can reduce
e of this maximand to optimization of land use for one
stage and of finding an optimal time to replace the
of the stage. Rewriting equation (3.3.b),
T -r(t'-t)











where Q is quantity of housing per land area, or density of
housing, initially built at time ti and T =T(t,{k}) is the end
period of development, endogenously determined.
The optimal series of structural inputs, {k(t')}, is
most likely be discontinuous - beginning from large construction
cost, and then a few substantial renovation outlays, with small
maintenance expenses inbetween. As this is too large a departure
from continuity, it is impossible to obtain a analytical solution
of the above dynamic optimization problem. It is still possible
to solve for individual period inputs, but it is much simpler yet
does not affect the essential feature we are looking for if we
convert it to a yet simpler optimization problem by ignoring all
but the initial construction cost.
This simplification amounts to regarding large scale
renovations as practically a redevelopment, other maintenance
costs as current expenses, and the depreciation of structure as
progressing exponentially and hence being represented by the dis-
count factor. In either dress, this assumption' does not seem to
be a serious misrepresentation in light of the empirical findings
on depreciation and maintenance. For example, Mendelssohn(1977)
found that home improvement and maintenance expenditures are
extremely small in comparison with construction cost, and fur-
ther, they are determined more by the economic characteristics of
the occupant than by physical condition of housing, supporting
the notion of these costs as essentially current expenses not the
durable investments that affect the whole revenue generation
plan. Margolis (1982) found that net depreciation or addition to
existing housing is very small (0.4% annual depreciation),
implying that economic obsolescence is the major aspect of
housing replacement.
The last point brings us to the question of what
determines the economic obsolescence of housing. First, the
termination time, T, can be specified as a function of the struc-
tural input per land area. This is because too low a density
yielding too little rental income would not be a viable form of
use to maintain when a project of much higher density and income
is feasible. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that
the marginal rental price of housing and the unit cost of struc-
tural inputs are independent of housing density. Therefore they
are analytically separable.
But we must add as an important determinant of income
and viability of land use the size of a housing unit, that is,
how many houses a given combination of land and structutre
(quantity of housing) is divided into. In general, there will be
an optimal quantity of housing for a household with a particular
utility function and budget. The household will bid the highest
marginal rental for an optimal sized house but less if it is too
small or too large. As the budget, prices and the utility leval
change, so does the optimal size of a dwelling unit. The quantity
of housing per dwelling unit can be modified by adding to or
subtracting from the existing-structure, which we assumed away;
or by subdivision or merger of the existing quantity of housing
per land area, but probably at a substantial cost. In general
both propositions are very costly. But at the time of initial
construction it would not be significantly more or less costly
to package a given quantity of housing in more or less number of
units. Again it is not strictly necessary but it simplifies our
analysis without substantially affecting the conclusions to
ignore the cost of initial packaging.
These simplifications and added considerations can be
formally written as
P(t',Q) = p(t',H)Q ; ck = ck(Q) ; and
T = T(t,H(t),Q(t)) (3.8)
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where Q(t) is the density of housing built at time t; p(t') the
marginal rental price of unit quantity of housing; and H(t) is
the size of a dwelling unit determined at the time of construction.
To further simplify the exposition, let us abbreviate as
F(H(t),t,T) the marginal capitalized value of the rental stream











F'(t;T,H(t)) = - p(Ht) + rF (3.10)
With this notation we can write the maximization of the
housing developer as the following.
-r(T-t)
V(t) = max {F(t,T,H)Q(t,T,k) - ck(t) + V(T) e }
(3.11)
The life-span of the housing, (T-t), is endogenously determined,
but the condition of its optimality is the same as equation
(3.6), and need not be repeated here. Then the first order condi-
tion for optimal structural density is reduced to
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Q'(k;t)F(t) - c = 0
where Q(t) and F(t) are now defined as optimum quntatities as of
time t. The second order condition is
Q"(k;t)F(t,T) < 0 (3.13)
which is satisfied as long as the production function is concave.




For a strictly quasi-concave utility function that will satisfy
the above second order. condition, a household's consumption of
housing and other goods is optimized with the maximum marginal
rental of housing at the point where the budget curve is tangent
to the indifference curve. If the household must occupy a house
with less quantity of housing than the optimal size, it would bid
less per quantity of housing. At the same time the houshold would
be willing to increase not only the quantity consumed but also
the marginal payment if a larger house is available. In case the
given house is too big, the bid rental would increase as the
dwelling unit becomes smaller, i.e., closer to the optimal size.
(For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Muth, 1973.) Equa-
tion (3.14) states that the initially determined size should be
an intermediate one, too big for times of lean demand but too
small. for times when larger houses are in demand, so that on
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(3.12)
average the effects of these price deviations from the contempo-
rary optimal level should even out during the lifespan of the
building. This very commomsensical condition prevents the ques-
tion of optimal dwelling size from unduly complicating our
subsequent analyses.
These conditions enable us to express the opportunity
cost of capital invested in land ownership, rV - V'(t), in a form
that does not explicitly depend upon land value but upon present
land use quantities. Differentiating land value as defined in
equation (3.11)
dV(t)/dt = V'(t) by the envelope theorem
-r(T-t)
= F'(t)Q(t) + F(t)Q'(t) - ck'(t) + rV(T)e
Substituting
F(t)Q'(t) - ck'(t) = 0
F'(t) = rF(t) - p(t)




V'(t) = Q(t)[rF(t) - p(t)] + V(T) e
-r(T-t)
= r[F(t)Q(t) - ck(t) + V(T) e ] + rck(t) - p(t)Q(t)
= rV(t) + rck(t) - p(t)Q(t) by eq.(3.1l)
i.e.,
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rV(t) - V'(t) = p(t)Q(t) - rck(t) (3.16)
by the definition (equation (3.5))
Combining this with the condition for optimal time for develop-
ment (-equation (3.6)), we obtain the following important Lemma.
[LEMMA 52 At the optimal time of development t*,
(a) J'(t*) = P(t*,-) - R(t*) = 0
(b) J"(t*) = P'(t*;-) - R'(t*) < 0
where P(t*,-) = R(f) for farm-to-urban conversion
= p(t*,H-)q(t*) for redevelopment of
built-up land; and
R(t*) = p(t*,H*)Q(t*) - rck(t*)
where q(t*) is density of existing housing to be
replaced at time t*;
Q(t*) is optimal density of new housing to be
built at time t*;
k(t*) is optimal structural density;
H* is the size of a new dwelling unit; and
H- is the size of the old dwelling unit.
Here (a) is a mere reexpresion of the combination of
equations (3.6) and (3.16). (b) is the second order condition for
optimal timing of land use change: In order for the time satis-
fying the first order condition to be the maximizing, not mini-
mizing, point the difference between the property rental income
over the opportunity cost of capital should be decreasing over
time.
Readers would have noticed that we used the symbol for
rent, R, to stand for the opportunity cost of capital in land
ownership (rV-V'(t)). Indeed there is a logical basis for such
definition. Though durability makes land value, not rent, the
primary land use parameter, it does not mean that land rent is
altogether irrelevant or indeterminate. With whatever form of
land use, land rent for a short period can be conceptualized as
the potential profit lost when land is left idle. In terms of
durable land use, it can be thought of as the profit foregone by
delaying for a period the best and highest land use program as
specified in the definition (equation (3.3) or (3.11)) of land
value. In terms of capital market equilibrium, it should equal
the opportunity cost of the capital used to buy the land (rV)
minus the gain from the delay that allows more profitable land
use (V'(t)). In short,
R(t) = rV(t) - V'(t)
It is easy to verify mathematically (by the basic pro-
perties of the homogeneous differential equation) that this term
is consistent with the concept of land value for permanent
ownership or for leasehold as the present value of the
discounted stream of rents. i.e.,
84
T(i) -r(t'-t)
[rV(t') - V'(t' )]e dt'
t(i)
-r(T(i)-t) -r(t(i)-t)
= V(T(i))e - V(t(i))e
-r(t(i)-t)
= A(i)e
Or, for integration from the present to the infinity,
-r(t'-t)
R(t')e dt' = V(t)
t
These relationships among rent, land value, and lease-
hold value are exactly the same as those in the static case as
they should be. As a consequence, we can take advantage of the
relationships between changes of land rent and value established
in the last chapter to analyze variations of land value for
durable housing. But it is important to remember that land rent
for durable land use is only a shadow variable derived from land
value, not vice versa; therefore it cannot contain any more
fundamental information than is already contained in land value.
For much of our spatial analysis below, it is sufficient for us
to know that shadow rent as defined above exists and that it is
determined uniquely as long as land value is well defined. Still,
the particular subset of information extracted as the shadow rent
constitutes all the essential information that we need for much
of the analysis of land use change.
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The significant aspect of the derivation of rent as in
equation (3.16) is the absence of any direct reference to the
future land use in the final definition of rent. This reexpres-
sion in quantities observable for each period only, eliminating
the burden of considering a long string of future land use,
offers us a few significant insight into the process of land use
change as we shall elaborate in the next section.
Since land value is defined in reference to the optimal
development possible at the moment even as other housing has
already been built and is preempting the land, equation (3.16)
defines the rent of urban land for all periods, not only for the
time of actual development. Hence land value can be obtained on
integration of the rent defined as above according to the capi-
talization formula.
An important qualification here is that this is valid
only for land being taken for the kind of urban use as defined in
the foregoing maximization problem. The land value (given by
equation (3.9) or (3.11)) upon which we base this definition of
rent is the shadow value of land for urban use, housing. Maximi-
zation of this land value starting from today may be dominated by
another option of keeping the land for agriculture for now and
building housing later. In this case, the value of the latter
option is the realized land value and the former, the sur-
plus generatable by developing urban housing immediately, remains
as a mere shadow value. Only if the option of immediate housing
development is superior to any other option of using the land (as
raw land), the shadow value becomes realized as the market value.
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Similarly, the shadow urban rent would be less than farm rent
before conversion to urban use actually happens. Having consi-
dered this, we can define land value and rent for any period
since farm rent is easy to define.
3.3 Further Properties of Optimal Land Use
The most basic properties of optimal land use are given
by the last Lemma which is actually a slightly different, a more
concise expression of the same information contained in equa-
tions (3.7) and (3.11) through (3.14). We will explore further
implications-of these properties in this section.
First, we note in Lemma 5 that our definition of urban
land rent is of exactly the same form as that under the assump-
tion of malleability or of durable development under the assump-
tion of myopic expectations despite the fact that we have not
imposed such strong assumptions in deriving the definition
(equations (3.1)). More to the point, it implies that the rela-
tionship between optimal land use investment and present rental
income is identical under any expectations of the future (See
equations (3.2) and (3.4)). The first equivalence is only a
formal resemblance, but it would be important to elaborate on the
latter point. Let us briefly recapitulate the analysis of the
last section concerning land use under the assumption of housing
malleability or myopic expectations.
87
In case land use is malleable, land rent for housing
production is derived from the present housing rental as the
surplus of the latter over the cost of the structural inputs
which are malleable and hence which incur only the one-period
opportunity cost of the purchase price. Since by assumption the
existing structure can always be modified, land use expenses for
adding more structural inputs to the existing housing should not
exceed, and in equilibrium should be equal to, the additional
revenue, i.e.
rck'(static) = p[Q - q] (3.2.b)
where k' represents the additional structural inputs
In case land use is durable but developers are assumed
to behave as if the present rental would remain the same in the
future as in the present, changing market conditions will render
the building inefficient but the land use cannnot be changed bit
by bit. It will be changed only if the existing building is
rendered completely obsolete by the standard of a newly possible
development, which again is determined under myopic expectations
so as that the expected profit from a new development is at
least equal to the present value of the rental income stream from
the existing housing (the right-hand side). In this case the
expected profit is the surplus of the present value of the new
housing over construction cost (the left-hand side of the imme-
diately following equation) - in short,. land value.
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pQ(myopic)/r - ck(myopic) = pq(myopic)/r
(3.17)
p[Q - q] = rck
Note that the above equation is different from equation
(3.2.b) which defines the condition for an optimal level of
additional malleable input only in that additional input k' is
substituted by the completely new structure, k(t). It reflects
the restriction imposed by the strict durabilty of structure that
if a modification is to be made to the land use it cannot be an
addition to the existing structure but it should be a completely
new construction. But this optimality condition under the
restriction is identical to Lemma 5 that is valid with any form
of expectations for the future.
In other words, as soon as the optimal time to replace
an existing land use is determined, the problem of finding an
optimal investment and housing density facing a developer is not
different from the one under the simple myopic expectations even
if the developer knows the rental will change over time. The
correct amount of the structural input can be decided using only
the knowledge of the present housing rental and the density of
the housing that is being replaced.
Of course, this does not mean that land use will change
in the same way under the three different regimes. Lemma 5
implies that the density of a new housing will be the same under
all regimes if the density of the existing housing are identical
at a given time of development. However, the timing of replacing
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, or
an existing land use will be different depending upon the pattern
of expectations. With durable land use it is land value and its
change that determine the timing, and it is eventually developers
that should determine the land value, with far more complications
under the general expectations than under myopic ones. Thus, the
identical form of the decision rules does not imply any magic
formula to simplify the decision of durable land use, except in
the sense that land value can be considered an exogenous variable
for a single developer if there is an active land market.
However, the formal equivalence of the optimality condi-
tion for land use change does have a significant implication for
choice of analytical strategy. In the comparative static world
land use change will occur every time the housing demand changes,
but specification of the timing of change in durable land use
requires specification of land use history of a city, under any
form of expectations. Once the timing is specified for locations
it is not a problem to define the optimal density even with a
general form of expectations. Therefore, we do not gain much
simplicity in describing the dynamics of land use in return for
restricting the pattern of expectations to that of myopic ones.
If the preceding reveals the similarity among land use
decisions under different regimes, we can in contrast find from
the same Lemma an essential difference that durability and
expected growth of housing demand would make. We have seen in the
last section that land value should be increasing at the time of
land use change if the income from the existing property is not
decreasing over time. This would normally, though not necessa-
rily, imply that the value of new housing would also be increas-
ing. But an even more basic condition can be seen to limit the
rate of increase of the latter. From Lemma 5, it is obvious that
urban rent is positive at the time of development as long as the
rental income of the existing use is positive.
R(t*) = p(t*)Q(t*) - rck(t*)
= P(t*,-) > 0 (3.18)
Substituting
c = FQ'(k) from (3.12)
K = Q'(k)k/Q
F'(t) = rF(t) - p(t) from (3.15)
and rearranging,
R(t*) = Q Lp - rFK]
Q [ -F'(t*) + rF - rFK ]
FQ [ r(l -K) - F*(t*)] > 0
i.e.,
?*(t*)/r < 1 - K (3.19)
In other words,
[PROPOSITION 3.l] A high growth rate of housing value relative to
the discount rate or a large share of construction cost in the
value would deter land use change.
This reveals a very important characteristic of durable
land use: that durability imposes an efficiency cost in terms of
suboptimality due to the inflexibility in the face of changing
demand conditions, and the cost is higher if the changes are
faster. The cost of inefficiency would be especially serious if
the developer has to extract a larger share of cost from the
inefficiently employed structural inputs.
Therefore, it will be more profitable to wait and opti-
mize at a higher density (see Proposition 3.2 below) rather than
to capitalize on the high expected rental income, however larger
this may be than the present income from the existing use, fore-
going a more efficient later development. This has the implica-
tion for aggregate housing supply that, when a city is growing
fast, over-building (relative to the present demand) in some
places in anticipation of larger future demands will be more or
less offset by the (we might say, speculative) holding of land in
other areas. It also implies that the housing rental and land
value at the city border would be much higher than under myopic
expectations.
Optimal housing and structural densities can be more
explicitly related to the capital value of housing, or the pre-
sent value of the rental stream, by elaborating on condition
(3.12). Differentiating,
FdQ'(k) + Q'(k)dF - dc = 0
Substituting
dQ'(k) = Q"(k)dk = Q"(k)dQ/Q'(k)
and rearranging,
dQ/Q = E(F) [dF/F - dc/c]
2
where E(F) = - Q'(k) /QQ"(k) > 0
by equations (3.12) and (3.13)
We may obviously call the last term the elasticity of housing
density with respect to the (unit capital) value of new housing
(relative to unit cost of structural inputs). This can be shown
to be equivalent to the increase of structural input in response
to change in land cost relative to its own unit cost, c the
relevant cost of land here being the leasehold value, A, covering
the lifespan of the housing. Since, by equation (3.12),
dA = QdF , and c = FQ'(k) ;
ignoring the variation of the structural input cost,
d(ck)/dA = c dk/QdF = FQ'(k)dk/QdF = (dQ/Q)/(dF/F) = E(F)
This then can be related to the elasticity of substitution
between the two factors in housing production, s.
dk A/c
S = by definition
d(A/c) k
dk A cdk A
- - = - - since dc = 0
dA/c ck dA ck
= E(F) (l-K)/K from the above equation.
where K = ck/FQ = Q'(k)k/Q
is factor income share of structure.
A/ck = (1-K)/K by definition
Summarizing the above relationships,
[LEMMA 6]
2
E(F) = - Q'(k) /QQ"(k)
=Q*(.)/F*(.) = ck'(.)/A'(.)
where "." stands for a dimension x, or t.
= sK/(l-K)
It is easy to show that variation in unit input cost can be
accommodated by substituting F/c for F in the above, or
[F*(.)-c*(.)] instead of F*(.).
This Lemma makes it apparent that the elasticity of
housing production (per land area) would not be constant as the
factor income shares are known to vary among locations and as a
city grows. For example, with s = 0.5, E(F) = 1.2 for K=0.7, and
E(F)=2.0 for K=0.8 . We have seen in section 2.2 that empirical
evidence strongly suggests that the elasticity of substitution
between land and structure is smaller than one, which implies
94
that the factor share of structure would decline as cost of land
increases. On the other hand, it is usually assumed that the
elasticity of substitution itself does not vary substantially,
and if it does at all, it increases with the factor share of
structural input (see Sirmans and Redman, 1979). Also, it is
apparent that the leasehold value of land, or the surplus from
housing development, increases with housing value and density.
Therefore,
[PROPOSITION 3.2] As the capital value of new housing and hence
optimal housing density increases, the factor income share of
structure and the elasticity of optimal density with respect to
housing value decrease. i.e.
dK/dF < 0 ; and
dE(F)/dK < 0
Using the preceeding analysis, we can find the ratio of
rental income from a new development to that from the existing
property to be replaced, a matter of practical interest. Rear-
ranging and substituting as in deriving equation (3.19), Lemma 5
can be rewritten
P(t*,-)/p(t*)Q(t*)= 1 - KrF/p (3.20)
For example, assuming that the average rate of expected
future growth in rentals is negligible so that rF(t*) is approxi-
mately equal to p(t*), the ratio would simply be equal to the
factor share of land, 1-K. That is, if K = 0.8, the new revenue
would be five times as much as before. Though large as this ratio
is, it probably is an underestimation because we have ignored two
very important deterrents of (re-) development, the increase of
rental and the cost of demolition or site-preparation.
The ratio of structural densities in redevelopment, k(Q)
versus k(q), can be approximated by the following:
Q - q = k'Q'(k: k=k(Q)-bk')
(3.21)
by the mean value theorem
where k' = k(Q) - k(q)
0 < b < l
By Taylor expansion, the last term is
2 2
Q'(k) = Q'(k(Q)) - bk'Q"(k(Q)) + b k' Q"'/2 -
Ignoring the third and higher derivatives and substituting in
equation (3.21) and assuming that marginal rental of the new and
the old housing differs by about the same amount (in opposite
directions) from the maximum level, i.e., p(H-) = p(H*),
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k' 1 - K




The positive solution of this equation is
k'/k [-1 + 1l + 4b(1-K)rF/ps ] s/2b(1 - K)
= 1 - k(q)/k(Q) (3.22)
For example, assuming s = 0.5, K = 0.8, rF/p = 1, and b = 0.5
k(Q)/k(q) = 8.4
We have mentioned above why this high ratio would still be an
underestimation. Therefore, this example implies that redeve-
lopment is justified only if the new building is close to or even
over ten times as capital intensive as the existing structure,




CHAPTER 4. SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF A GROWING CITY
In this chapter we combine the analytical results of
chapter 2 and the tools developed in chapter 3 to examine spatio-
temporal patterns of land use and value in a dynamically growing
city. Durable housing is expected to cause departures from the
comparative static patterns, and a number of substantial depar-
tures have been suggested by many recent dynamic models. We
evaluate the significance of the suggested departures. Detailed
review of the previous models is not attempted here but deferred
until the next chapter. We first consider spatial differences in
land value and its appreciation as in the second chapter.
4.1 Dynamics of Land Value
Some authors argued that land value can increase with
distance from the city center when durabiltiy is introduced, a
very important departure from the comparative statics of the
monocentric city model and one that is infrequently but not
rarely observed empirically. While acknowledging this theoretical
and empirical possibiltiy, we can nevertheless show as a matter
of simple logic that it is not possible as long as we maintain
the basic premise of the simple monocentric city model, namely
that cost of transportation to the city center is the only
intrinsic distinction among locations.
Suppose an optimal land use program is defined for a
certain location (as in equation (3.3)), and suppose further that
it is exactly copied at another location closer to the center.
Since residents always prefer and thus are willing to pay more
for a closer location, all other things being equal, the same
housing will yield more revenue at the closer location while the
construction -cost, by premise, is the same. Hence, at the closer
location there will be more surplus and higher land value. In
fact, the closer site must be taken better advantage of so that
it will yield even more surplus. Because land value depends only
on the possible optimal use and does not depend on the existing
use, the preceeding is always true. The pairwise comparison can
be generalized for any location that is or will be affected by
the access to the center. Therefore, land value decreases with
distance everywhere in the city and also around it if the city is
expected to expand. If land is evaluated solely on the basis of
presently feasible land use, the slope of agricultural land value
would of course be zero. Thus,
[PROPOSITION 4.1] In a monocentric city, land value decreases
with distance from the city center. Further, with expectations of
future urban expansion, the same is true for farm land near the
city.
Though at times a positive land value gradient has been
argued to be possible with durable housing even under the assump-
tion of the monocentric city (Anas,1978, for example), this seems
to be only the result of an incorrect definition of land value.
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As long as the correct definition of land value is used, the
above Proposition is valid without depending upon any special
assumptions. It is true, to consider one important element that
we have ignored in the analysis of the last chapter, that demoli-
tion cost of a badly run-down existing structure subtracts from
the property value and can even make it negative. But the criti-
cal point to remember here is that the negative value should be
attributed to the existing structure and hence to the property
as a whole; but land value should always be defined as the value
of raw land, whether the existing structure is highly valuable or
highly detrimental.
The point of the foregoing is not to maintain that land
value must always be declining in any circumstances but merely
that a positive -land value gradient is impossible almost by
definiton within the simple monocentric model. An explanation for
a positive land value gradient cannot be provided by conditions
of durability within this framework but must be sought from
entirely different perspectives. Factors other than the accessi-
bility that affect land value are too numerous to list here.
To analyze the pattern of secular change in the land
value distribution, we have to determine beforehand the change of
the housing rental that is the underlying price from which the
former is derived. To this end, let us assume that consumption
of housing by households can be adjusted instantaneously, given
the housing stock of a city which is durable. The assumption
means first that households can relocate quickly and costlessly
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as demand condition changes. This may not be a gross simplifi-
cation as the adjustment on average takesa reasonably short time
in comparison with supply adjustments. Secondly it means that
housing suppliers can reassemble the housing so that each house
would be an optimum size (quantity of housing per dwelling unit)
for the prevailing demand conditions, although they cannot add to
the existing housing density without redevelopment. This assump-
tion of durable yet divisible housing is not incorporated in our
main body of analysis as it is hardly acceptable as we have
discussed in section 2.2. For now, however, we want to specify
the distribution of the maximum rental among locations, and
shortly thereafter we show that the final analysis does not
depend on the suboptimality of dwelling unit size in an essential
way.
Under the assumptions we can describe the changes in
housing consumption and pricing essentially as a comparative
static process, although the housing stock and hence land con-
sumption must be determined under the constraints of durability.
In Chapter 2, we have shown that the comparative static patterns
of urban land rent is equally valid for distribution of housing
rental prices.
For an open city, local comparative static changes can
be specified by reference only to locally applicable parameters
(income and transportation cost) without concern for the adjust-
ment of the city as a whole (in utility level and total popula-
tion). Total availability of housing and the ratio of land and
structure cannot be adjusted fully when housing is durable, and
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hence the total city population and the amount of land used for
housing are largely influenced by the existing housing stock. But
this does not affect income of the household, utility level, and
transportation cost. Therefore the rental price and quantity of
housing consumed by a household at a given location are not
affected by durability of the existing stock, if households can
adjust their consumption as assumed. Consequently, the compara-
tive static properties of housing rental, that are exactly the
same as those of land rent with proper substitutions as we have
seen in section 2.1, can be transferred to the case with durable
housing without qualitative change.
For a closed city, however, we must determine the endo-
genous changes in utility level which we cannot transfer directly
from the comparative static to dynamic analysis. In order to
determine this, we have to specify long-term planning of house-
holds for consumption, savings, and by implication, utility, as
well as long-term planning by land and housing suppliers. This
does not appear to be a feasible analytical task at present if we
are to keep the concept of durability and land value as discussed
in the first Section. (This pessimistic view is explained in
Malinvaud, 1972.) Intuitively, however, it does not seem an
overly dubious proposition to infer as in the comparative static
analysis that, other things being equal: population increase
would reduce the level of utility, increase housing rental and
hence its gradient; and an increase in income and reduction of
transportation cost would cause a shift in demand for location in
102
favor of outer locations and hence flatten the rental gradient.
Therefore, we transfer the results of the comparative
static analysis of growing cities as the following Proposition
with some reservations about the validity of the third part for a
closed city.
[PROPOSITION 4.2] In a monocentric city, where housing is homo-
geneous and divisible,
(a) the marginal rental price of housing decreases with distance
from the center, i.e. p'(x) <0
(b) when the population, income, or transportation efficiency of
a city grows, housing rental gradient flattens, i.e.
dp*(x)/dx > 0 ; and further,
(c) in the case of a growing open city, the marginal rental of
housing increases everywhere, i.e. p'(t) > 0 .
From this we can easily derive the following interme-
diate Propositions leading to our goal of specifying the pattern
of land value appreciation.
[PROPOSITION 4.3] Unit capital value of new housing and the
leasehold value of land for new housing decline with distance
from the center, i.e,




as p'(x;t') < 0 for all x and t'
by Proposition 4.2.a.
A = FQ - ck by definition. See equations (3.3)
and (3.11).
A'(x) = F'(x)Q + FQ'(x) - ck'(x)
= F'(x)Q < 0 by equation (3.12).
The result is the same if we define the rental to vary with the
size of the dwelling unit, H(t), because by equation (3.14)
F'(H) = 0
The termination time, T, is the only relevant endogenous
variable that is fixed in the above. But this partial differen-
tiation is adequate for specifying full variation of rent which
is of primary interest to us here (see Proposition 4.5 below).
This is so because all but the rent of the initial period are
unaffected by T(t). Therefore it only equalizes the length of
time over which to compare streams of rental without affecting
the rentals within the interval. The following is again defined
for a given length of housing life.




F'(x = p'(x;t' e
t
housing value flattens with monotonic growth of the city's
income, population, or transportation efficiency over time. i.e.,
dF*(x)/dt > 0
(b) The gradient of the leasehold value of land also flattens
with the same growth, unambiguously in an open city and probably




















p*(x; t) < F*(x;t) = p*(x;t": t<t"<T)
< p*(x;T)




A*(x) = F'(x)Q/(l - K)FQ = F*(x)/(l-K)
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dA*(x) dF*(x) dK
/(l-K) + F*(x) -/(1-K)
dt dt dt
The first term is positive by the immediately preceeding. The
second will be also positive if the housing value increases over
time for then the factor share of structure decreases (see Propo-
sition 3.2), i.e.
dK/dt = (dK/dF)(dF/dt) < 0 while F*(x) < 0.
Housing rental and capital value always and everywhere
increase with the growth of an open city and thus the Propo-
sition is unambiguous there. They may decrease in central loca-
tions of a growing closed city. In this special instance, the
gradient of leasehold value still may flatten because of the
positive first term. In most locations the housing rental
increases and the Proposition holds.
Q.E.D.
[PROPOSITION 4.5] The gradient of the shadow urban rent of land
is negative and flattens in a growing city, i.e.
R*(x) < 0 and dR*(x)/dt > 0
Proof. By analogy with equation (4.1), we can write
dA*(x;t)/dt = [-R*(x;t) + A*(x;t)]R(t)/A(t)
-r(T-t)
= [R*(x;T) - A*(x;t)]R(T)e /A(t)
Reversing the proof of the above Proposition, this would be
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positive if and only if
dR*(x;t)/dt > 0
i.e.,
R*(x;t) < A*(x;t) = R*(x;t") < R*(x;T)
where t < t"< T
Since A*(x) < 0 always, it follows that
R*(x) = R'(x)/R < 0
Q.E.D.
It is noteworthy that we have not been able to prove
that the rent gradient is negative in general but only in the
case where the city is growing. In other words, in urban decline
the rent gradient may be positive. It must be remembered that we
have derived this Proposition from the Proposition on leasehold
value, not the other way around, just as we derived the defini-
tion of rent itself from land value and its change. Since we have
already seen that leasehold value and ordinary land value have
negative slopes, we can infer that rent may increase with dis-
tance but only for a short while.
In proving the conclusion about different land value
appreciation rates among locations in the camparative static
urban growth (Proposition 2.10) we needed only the equivalent of
Propositions 4.1 and 4.5, namely that land value and rent
gradients are negative and the latter flattens with urban growth.
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Employing exactly the same procedure used in the proof of
Proposition (2.10), we obtain its dynamic counterpart that is
qualitatively the same.
[PROPOSITION 4.61 In a growing monocentric city, land value
appreciates faster in areas farther from the center; outside the
city boundary, the appreciation rate is zero under myopic
expectations, but positive and decreasing with distance under
rational expectations.
4.2 Progression of Urban Expansion
In the comparative static case, land use depends only
upon the present parameters and it has a direct correspondence
with land rent. With durable housing, land use is more heavily
influenced by the past and the future and its relationship with
land value is more complicated. Though the last concluding Propo-
sition about land value with durable housing was shown to be
qualitatively identical to that with malleable housing, it owes
much to the fact that land value is determined only in reference
to the future even with durable housing as is the case with land
value as a capitalization of future static rents. Durable land
use is not so free from the past as the existing structure
cannot easily be changed. Despite this, would there be a similar
match between static and dynamic land use patterns? Our conclu-
sion in this and the following sections might be interpreted as
either a yes or a no, but a much qualified one, either way.
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First of all, it is not a foregone conclusion when and
where farm land is converted to durable urban use. In a compara-
tive static world, land is used for housing as long as the one-
period rent bid by the housing producer (as defined by equation
(3.1)) or consumer (equation (2.2)) exceeds farm rent. Since rent
is always higher in more central locations, areas within the
farthest reach of the urban settlemefit must be comletely used up
by housing. As the city grows, it expands its territory by anne-
ing the immediate neighborhood of the existing development.
However, this may not be the case in a dynamic urban
growth. This complication is due to the optimal development rule
described in Proposition 3.1. Even if a site can be developed
immediately to return a surplus larger than agricultural income,
it might be better to wait for a later opportunity for a more
efficient use if the housing rental is increasing very fast.
Under myopic expectations, of course, there is no such waiting.
But in general it is possible that land in more central locations
is held in this fashion surrounded by already developed urban
areas. In other words, initial city building begins at a point
far from the city center and proceed inward toward the center, as
suggested by Wheaton(1982a) and Brueckner and von Rabenau(1980).
However, just as the the decline of rent with distance
from the center assures that the urban area expands outward from
the center in comparative statics, so does the similar pattern of
urban shadow rent in dynamics. In a growing city, we have seen
that this is the case (Proposition 4.5); thus the city building
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proceeds in the normal inside-out pattern. To formally elaborate,
we first take note that Lemma 5 must hold at any time t* when the
conversion occurs. Wholly differentiating J'(t*,x) = 0 ,
dJ'(t*,x) dt*




We know from Lemma 5(b) that J"(t*) should be negative
if the conversion time is to be a maximizing point. Therefore,
the sign of dt*/dx is the same as the sign of the numerator.
Partially differentiating Lemma 5(a) with respect to distance,
J"(x,t*) =a[R(farm) - R(urban)]/ax
- R'(x:farm) - R'(x:urban)
If farm rent is positive and constant, this second derivative is
positive as
R'(x:urban) = R(farm)R*(x;t*)
since at time t* farm rent
and urban rent are the same.
< R(farm)A*(x;t*) < 0
by Propositions 4.4 and 4.5.
Therefore, dt*/dx is positive. In other words, the time
for conversion arrives later at farther locations and the city
expands from the center outward. This conclusion can be reversed
only if the gradient of the urban shadow rent is positive. This
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can happen in urban decline where, as Proposition 4.5 implies by
exclusion,
R*(xit) > A*( xit)
But note that this implies only the possibility of a positive
rent gradient, not a necessity, because the gradient of leasehold
value on the right hand side is always negative.
We have expressed a reservation in proving Propositions
4.4 and 4.5 that the rent gradient may not be steeper than the
gradient of leasehold value in a growing closed city, since
housing rental may decline there even during urban growth. But
this problem does not concern us here because land value and
hence by implication housing rental should be increasing in order
that the conversion actually happens.
Therefore the urban growth as specified in Proposition
4.2 rules out the possibility of outside-in city builiding. To
obtain such a pattern, we must have a city that expands its
territory while declining in some aspects. In an open city, such
a mixed growth is hard to imagine because if any measure of city
size increases the others follow suit. However, for a closed
city, it can happen as seen in rapid progression of population
growth in some Third world cities even while the real income or
transportation efficiency decreases.
Another interesting possibility is a case of urban phy-
sical expansion without or beyond what can be accounted for by
concurrent growth in population, income or transportation effi-
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ciency. We can recall Proposition 2.9 that says that if avail-
ability of land for the city is increased by removal of some
barriers to urban use of land such as legal prohibition of buil-
ding or physical impediments, utility level of residents
increases, the city expands, and the rent gradient flattens.
In order for these changes to have similar effects for a
city with durable housing, the following must be true: The avail-
ability of land is increasing gradually and this is foreseen by
developers, but not before the city is substantially built up and
the significant growth of population or income has ceased. This
theoretically inelegant scenario is perhaps quite close to real
world situations of many cities whose already large urban built-
up areas are being extended far and thin into newly opening
suburbs. In many of the large cities, essentially insignificant
growth of population is dominated by rapid addition of available
building land by generous extension of infrastructures and chang-
ing life-style that has turned the suburban living as a respect-
able choice. Then we can expect the additional territory to be
filled up from the outside - although what is outside would
become the middle in the following period as the boundary of
buildable land expands - and the housing rental and land value
gradient to steepen. It might be a part of the process of the
leap-frogging suburban developments.
In summary of the foregoing:
[PROPOSITION 4.7] Initial conversion of farm land for urban use
in a closed city progresses from outside in toward the city
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center if the expansion is chiefly caused by increasing avail-
ability of land; or by growth in population, income, or trans-
portation efficiency coupled with an offsetting decrease in other
parameter(s). In all other cases, an open or a closed city ex-
pands its territory in the normal manner, outward from the
center.
We have so far ignored one other possible course of city
building: It may proceed neither outward or inward but simulta-
neously and continuously over all areas to be eventually built-up
fully. For some time, farms and houses would coexist in a neigh-
borhood, housing eventually filling up the area. Hochman and
Pines (1982) obtained such a process as the optimal one for a
growing open city. They have shown further that areas closer to
the center would be developed more heavily than areas far from
the center but the difference of land use intensity would be
reduced over time. This sounds very similar to the flattening
density gradient of a growing city that we have obtained in
chapter 2. But the analytical framework of the above study is
very dissimilar to ours, and we need to proceed within our frame-
work before evaluating their conclusion.
Formally, the pattern arises when J"(t*) = 0 and the
optimal time of development is not uniquely defined. If so, it
must also be that
J"(xt*) = R'(x:farm) - R'(x:urban) = 0 (4.3)
so that
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dt*/dx = 0/0 = indefinite
at all locations that are eventually to be fully developed for
urban housing. If J"(t*) is zero but J"(x,t*) is non-zero, the
difference in the optimal development timing between adjacent
locations is infinite, i.e., one of the locations is never deve-
loped for housing. This should happen only at the border of the
city, and condition (4.3) should be true in all locations within
the boundary until they are completely filled up with urban
housing.
But the condition specified in equation (4.3) is hard to
sustain for a long time alongside the condition that urban land
value always decreases with distance (Proposition 4.1) and that
its slope flattens with urban growth (Proposition 4.6.) We have
seen that it is possible for these conditions to coexist for a
short while. But it must be only a short while, meaning t-hat the
whole city is built up very quickly and goes through redevelop-
ments without expanding the territory. This is clearly implausible.
The condition (4.3) is always true in the trivial sense,
if the only opportunity cost of land is the urban rent instead of
the farm rent in the equation. This presupposes that there is no
competing land use of qualitatively different kind and therefore
there is no sharp discontinous break in the use of any site. In
other words, Hochman and Pines's model apparently depicts a
process of incremental modifications of land use in an already
built-up urban area. Though it seems a viable framework for a
study of housing production at an aggregate level, it cannot
114
reveal many important properties of discontinuous land develop-
ment processes and of the competitive market for individual
building sites. In short, the simultaneou-s building of a city is
not a plausible pattern in so far as it is difficult to add
marginal quantities of housing to agricultural land or to exist-
ing housing, as discussed in the last chapter.
Before we conclude this section, it is necessary to
point out that the progression of city building discussed above
applies only to the conversion of previously undeveloped farm
land. After the initial city building has proceeded to a certain
extent, some earlier vintages would become ripe for retirement
before or at the same time with a still further expansion of the
city into the farm land. How soon the original building becomes
uneconomical and how the redevelopment progresses would depend
upon relative distribution of land use intensity. In the next two
sections, therefore, we consider these issues jointly.
4.3 Pattern of Land Use Density and Redevelopment
In comparative statics, densities always decline with
distance from the center, as does the housing rental of each
period that entirely determines optimal density. Even with
durable housing, density of development is entirely dependent
upon the present housing rental if developers expect it to remain
constant in the future. This is a special case of the maximiza-
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tion discussed in section 3.2, with the present value of expected
future rental stream p(t*)/r, where r is the discount rate. Then
the relationship between optimum density and housing rental is
given by the condition (3.12) with corresponding substitution,
and it is exactly the same as the optimality condition for malle-
able housing given by equation (3.2):
p(t*)Q'(k(t*)) - rc = 0 (4.4)
Consequently, if the city is built all at once, structu-
ral density would decrease with distance and so would the popou-
lation density because
d Q Q
n*(x) = -(-)/- = Q*(x) - H*(x) < 0 (4.5)
dx H H
However, as we have discussed in the last section, the
city is built up gradually from the center under the myopic
expectations with the result that areas developed at different
times would reflect parameters effective at respective dates of
development. The density of housing older than the current
vintage and closer to the center is no longer optimal in view of
the current housing rental at the location, but it remains in
service as long as it still provides gross revenue larger than
the net revenue (gross minus construction cost) of a new devel-
opment. Therefore it is necessary to specify what has been the
optimal density at the time of development of each location. The
answer is very simple:
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[PROPOSITION 4.8] Under myopic expectations, the density of hous-
ing is the same for all initial vintages built on land converted
from farm as long as the farm rent, discount rate, and price of
structural input are constant over location and time.
It can be easily seen if we reflect on two sets of basic
relationships: that housing density depends only on the housing
rental prevailing at the time and place of conversion; and the
urban shdow rent, for it is determined uniquely for a given set
of housing rental and density, should be the same as the farm
rent. Nevertheless, since the conclusion appears to contradict
earlier research, it may help clarify our meaning if we formalize
the reflection.
Lemma 5 specifies the relationship between farm rent,
housing rental, and density at any time of conversion, t*:
R(farm) = R(t*:housing) = p(t*)Q(t*) - rck(t*)
From equation (4.4) we know that Q and k are determined comple-
tely by p, r, and c. That is, we can write
Q(t*) = Q(k(p(t*),r,c))
Therfore the above Lemma can be restated as
R(farm) = R(p(t*),r,c)
This would be valid if and only if p(t*) and hence Q(t*) is
constant for all t*, under the assumption of constant farm rent,
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discount rate, and price of structural input. Note that the first
step of the proof is valid only under the assumption of the
constant returns to scale in housing production.
The constant structural density does not necessarily
mean the same for the population density. Its distribution
would depend upon the size of a dwelling unit occupied by each
household at different vintages. If housing is divisible so that
it can be instantaneously and costlessly repackaged into houses
whose size is optimal for the particular location and time,
population density decreases with distance, and further, the
gradient flattens in urban growth. This is because distribution
of population density in this instance is the exact mirror image
of optimal housing consumption per household. For, from equation
(4.5)
n*(x) - H*(x) = E(p)p*(x) < 0
where E(p) is compensated elasticity of housing demand
with respect to housing rental.
and, by Proposition 4.2,
dn*(x)/dt = E(p)dp*(x)/dt > 0
However, if the dwelling unit size remains fixed as set
at the time of development, the pattern of population distribu-
tion is different between a closed and an open city. In the case
of an open city, the constancy of the housing rental at the time
of development implies that the size of dwelling is always the
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same. This is because the relationship between the marginal
price and the quantity of housing consumed per household stays
the same if the utility remains constant, as the following formal
derivation shows.
dH(xt*) p dt*
- = - E(p)p'(x;t*,H*) - E(p)p'(t*;x,H*)
dx H dx
(4.6)




Therefore, population density gradient is flat until redevelop-
ment alters the housing density and the dwelling unit size in
some places. Adjustment of housing consumption in a closed city
is very different from the case of an open city. Cross-sectional
variation in housing consumption over location at a certain time
is the utility compensating difference in both types of cities.
Secular changes in housing rental and consumption are also the
same kind in an open city. But, in a closed city, the changes are
accompanied with a change in utility. Therefore, we must substi-
tute the ordinary elasticity (E(^p)) for the compensated elasti-




- = - E(p)p'(x)
dx H
p dt*
- [E(^p)p'(t*) - -E(yH)y'(t*)]
9 dx
where E(^p) is the ordianry price elasiticity
of housing demand;
E(yH) is income elasticity of housing
demand; and
y(x) is the disposable income after


















The terms outside the brackets are all positive. If the housing
rental increases solely as a result of an increase in population,
the bracketed term would be negative because the housing rental
increase is postive and the income change is zero. Then the size





distance. However, if the rental increases either as a result of
a rise in the total income or a reduction in the transportation
cost, the increase in housing rental cannot absorb all the
increase in the spendable income. Thus, the bracketed term
becomes positive, the dwelling unit size increases, and the
density decreases over time and over distance.
In summary of the foregoing,
[PROPOSITION 4.9] The population density over original housing
vintages
(a) is constant over all locations in an open city where housing
is indivisible and the size of a dwelling unit is fixed as
determined at the time of development;
(b) increases' with distance in a closed city with indivisible
housing where total population is increa'sing; but otherwise
(c) decreases with distance from the center, and further, its
gradient flattens over time if housing is divisible.
How redevelopment proceeds can be determined by employ-
ing the same method used in the last section. Writing the time of
redevelopment as t**, and the density of the existing housing as
q which is constant over distance,
J"(xt**) = PI(x;t**,q) - p'(x;t**)Q(t**)
since pQ'(x) - rck'(x) = 0
by equation (4.4)}
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= p'(x;t**)q + qp'(H(q))H'(x;q) - p'(x;t**)Q
= p'(x;t**)Lq - Q] + qp'(H(q))H'(x;q)
(4.8)
The first term in the above is positive because the housing
rental decreases with distance and because the new housing
density must be larger than the old one. However, the second term
depends upon specification as in the immediately foregoing analy-
sis. In case dwelling unit size is always adjusted to gain the
maximum rental, p'(H(q)) = 0. Also in case dwelling unit size is
fixed from the time of development but is constant over distance,
as we have seen to be the case in an open city, H'(x) = 0. Thus
the second term vanishes, and J"(xt**) is'unambiguously positive.
dt**/dx = -J"(xt**)/J"(t**) > 0
That is, redevelopment again proceeds outward from the center.
In the case of a closed city where the dwelling unit
size remains unchanged over time, we have seen that the size de-
creases with distance if the city grows purely by force of
increasing population. If this pattern of growth continues, the
optimum size of housing in later years must be smaller than at
the time of earlier developments: therefore, p'(H(q))<0. Conse-
quently the second term of equation (4.7) is positive. In case
the growth occurs because of continually rising income or
improving transportation, the sign of each component of the
second term is exactly opposite to the preceeding case, again
resulting in the positive second term. In other words, as long as
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the nature of growth is consistent in time, redevelopment starts
from the center and spreads out in a closed city, too. But the
situation becomes ambiguous if the optimal size of dwelling unit
was decreasing over time and over distance at the time of earlier
development-s but has since increased, or vice versa.
The density of these second generation housing vintages
would be decreasing with distance if the following is negative:
dp(t**)/dx = p'(x) + p'(t**)dt**/dx




Substituting in the preceeding equation,
dp(t**)/dx = 0
Again, redevelopment occurs when the housing rental reaches a
certain constant level. Consequently the density of structure in
redevelopment is constant regardless of location. Therefore,
except in the case of a closed city where size of dwelling is
fixed and its optimal level has increased over time, the pattern
of redevelopment is qualitatively the same as that of initial
city building. In other words, with "usually" signifying such an
exception,
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[PROPOSITION 4.10] Redevelopment (and re-redevelopment, etc.)
usually proceeds outward from the center, with constant density
of housing for every redeveloped site. Population density dec-
reases, increases, or stays constant over distance as described
in Proposition 4.9.
Combining the results on initial and later developments,
we can state the following general cases and exceptions. Here a
"generation" of housing means the vintages built as the first
housing on a piece of land, the second one, etc.
(i) Structural densities of different vintages of a same genera.-
tion of housing is constant regardless of location and the time
of development.
(ii) Population density at a given moment decreases with distance
from the city center if the size of a dwelling unit can be
adjusted. If the dwelling size is fixed from the time of develop-
ment, population density is constant over distance in an open
city where utility remains constant through time; increases with
distance in a closed city with growing population; and decreases
over distance if the income or transportation efficiency has been
growing in a closed city.
(iii) There will be a sharp break in population and structural
densities at the boundary between succeeding generations of hous-
ing. Redevelopment proceeds outward from the center in most
instances. Therefore the shift of density at the point of discon-
tinuity is downward over distance.
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The crucial element of the conclusion is the first part,
that structural densities are the same within the same genera-
tion. Its validity depends upon the apparently reasonable assump-
tion that the farm rent, discount rate, and construction input
price are constant over time and location and that there is no
economies of scale in housing production.
Even with the assumption, the structural density would
not be constant over distance if we adopt a discrete time frame-
work. A ring of some width would be developed all at once at the
beginning of a discretely marked period. Therefore, the structu-
ral density decreases with distance within this area. This frame-
work assumes that land is developed only at certain intervals of
time, in other words, that land cannot be developed in the middle
of a period even if the condition of development is satisfied.
But the farthest edge of the vintage must exactly satis-
fy the condition, and the density at the far edge would be the
same for each vintage. The inner location of a newer and farther
vintage would have a higher density than the edge of the earlier,
closer vintage. As a result, the structural and population
densities would show a "saw-tooth" pattern with sharp breaks at
borders of succeeding vintages. Distribution of the average den-
sity of differently aged housing depends entirely upon specifica-
tion of the time path of urban expansion. If, for example, each
succeding vintage were to occupy a ring narrower than the preced-
ing one, its average structural density would be lower than that
of the earlier developments and the structural density can be
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said to decline over distance in a statistical sense.
When developers expect future rentals to be different
from the present one, they optimize combination of inputs in
reference to the expected present value of the stream of future
housing rentals. The relationship between the structural density
and the marginal capital value of housing was given by (3.12)
F(t*)Q'(k(t*)) = c
The shadow rent at the time of development must again be equal to
the farm rent that is assumed constant:
R(farm) = R(t*) = p(t*)Q(t*) - rck(t*) Lemma 5
Unlike the case under myopic expectations, the housing rental
does not have to be constant for all t* because different combi-
nations of the values of p(t*), F(t*), and hence Q(t*) can now be
compatible with the condition specified in Lemma 5. But the
expected change in the future rentals is not enough to cause a
fundamental difference in the pattern of development density from
that under myopic expectations, the constant structural density.
For example, if the housing rental is expected to change at a
fixed rate, the present rental can completely define the expected
present value, F(t*), and therefore the condition of Lemma 5 is
met with a constant value of p(t*).
However, We have seen in the first section that the rate
of change in housing rental is in general not constant over
distance, and in Proposition 3.1 that it is not constant over
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time, either. If the developers recognize these differences,
there will be different densities of development. This flexibili-
ty makes analytical determination of density distribution very
difficult and we will present only a tentative sketch.
The problem is whether the following is negative:
dQ(t*) dt*-
= Q'(x) + Q'(t*)
dx dx
dt*
= Q(t*) E(F) LF*(x) + F*(t*)-] (4.9)
dx
by Lemma 6
We have seen in the first section that the first term in the
brackets, the gradient of housing value, is negative and is flat-
tening in urban growth. We have seen in section 3.2 that F*(t*)
must be positive if the development is to occur on the land whose
revenue from the existing use is not decreasing. Therefore, if
the urban expansion proceeds from the outside toward the center,
the above would be unambiguously negative, i.e. the structural
density decreases with distance.
But if the city is built up beginning from the center,
as is normally the case, the effect of the secular increase in
housing density somewhat offsets the negtive slope of density in
distance at one period. A general evaluation of the net effect
is not possible but we can limit the range of its value by
remembering Proposition 3.1 that says
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F*(t*) < r(l - K)
Rewriting equation (4.8) in a more easily decipherable form,
dQ/dx < 0 if and only if
F*(x) < - F*(t*)dt*/dx < - r(l-K)dt*/dx
or (4.10)
dx/dt* > - r(l-K)/F*(x) = - r/A*(x)
since A*(x) = F*(x)/(l-K)
(see proof of Proposition 4.4)
The last expression is not difficult to evaluate from
common empirical observations. dx/dt* is simply the width of the
ring of urban extension for each period, and the gradient of
leasehold value should be steeper than that of ordinary land
value in a growing city. (See Proposition 4.5) Let us try and
make a rough guess at the numerical values. There are not many
reports on empirical values of the land value gradient for cities
in the initial growth stage. But one such study by Mills (see the
next chapter) on early years of Chicago reports (absolute value
of) land value gradient of 0.33 for 1873, and 0.49 for 1857. On a
different occasion, he also reports value gradients for Korean
cities, and those of medium sized cities were found to be in the
range of 0.35 to 0.83. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that
the gradient of land leasehold value would be larger than 0.5 in
a newly growing city. Then, for a discount rate less than 0.1,
the expansion of a city by more than 0.2 miles per year would
guarantee the density of structure falling with distance. On
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average, these values seem fairly conservative estimates, but
apparently they constitute a flimsy ground on which to base a
definite and general prediction.
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Chapter 5. IMPACT of the PROPERTY TAX
on LAND USE and VALUE
5.1 Definition of the Issue
A primary policy implication of the foregoing analysis
of urban growth impacts is educational: as it is shown that dif-
ferences in land value appreciation can be explained as an out-
come of resource allocation by the competitive (and by standard
economic implication, efficient) market, policy makers need be
cautious in condemning and trying to suppress every land value
appreciation that does not fall into line with the rest of the
land market. The conceptual scheme and analytical methods deve-
loped in the foregoing context can be applied to a more direct
and traditional policy issue, the impact of the property tax on
residential real estate.
The property tax is one of the major policy instruments
that directly and specifically affect the urban spatial economy,
and it has naturally been studied extensively by economists.
Almost all existing studies have been concerned with aggregate
effects of the tax: for example, the effect of the tax on the
level of housing production and housing price in a locality taken
as a whole. The implicit and explicit focus of interest is then
on the comparative effects of different tax rates between juris-
dictions, such as the effect on households' choice of residential
location among different communities, or on sectors of pro-
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duction, such as allocation of investment capital between housing
versus production equipment. These studies do not say anything
about the distribution of the impact among locations within a
jurisdiction. We have seen in the foregoing chapters that an
ostensibly undifferentiated exogenous shock such as a uniform
increase in household income or an increase in aggregate popula-
tion of a city results in varying effects among locations within
the city. It is not difficult to infer that similar differentia-
tion would pertain to the impact of the property tax even though
the tax rate is supposed to be uniform for all housing within a
city, and that the tax would affect the use of land differently
than it does structural factors. We want to determine the pattern
of this differentiation.
It is well established, in theory at least, that taxing
land value or rent alone does not affect resource allocation as
long as the land is taxed without regard to how it is used. But
such a pure land tax is hard to find in practice, and normally it
is housing rather than land alone that is taxed. Even if housing
is subject to taxation, one theoretical conclusion of the exist-
ing studies is that it will not affect resource allocation as
long as there is no difference in the tax rates across jurisdic-
tions and sectors. However, the uniform tax is again purely
hypothetical and normally the tax rates are different across the
sectors or across jurisdictions or both. Also, a tax on housing
does not affect the use of each input factor in the same manner.
The property tax that we deal with in this chapter is the diffe-
rential tax, a difference in the rate of tax on residential real
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estate in a city over the rate on other forms of capital in the
same city or the rate of real estate tax imposed in other
jurisdictions.
There ususally are quite a few municipalities with dif-
ferent tax systems of their own within a typical metropolitan
area of the U.S., and this makes the interjurisdictional effect
of taxation as one of the most visible aspects of local property
tax system. Even then, it is not the only important effect of the
property tax. Further, many other countries do not exhibit such a
large degree of fiscal segmentation and the tax rate tends to be
uniform within a metropolitan area. Then the issue of intra-
jurisdictional impact of the tax obviously bears significant
implications on the matter of equity and resource allocation.
As mentioned earlier, the subject is generally neg-
lected. But it has not entirely been so, and let us take a brief
look at the few studies there are on this subject. Representative
of one type of approach to the question is Haurin's analysis
(1980). Employing the framework of the monocentric (open) city
model, he has found that an increase in the tax rate on housing
rental would reduce housing consumption everywhere and steepen
the density gradient. We are interested in deriving the same type
of result (and in fact reach a similar conclusion for the parti-
cular situation). However, we will not adopt his assumption that
the tax is reimbursed in monetary goods to taxpayers and that
utility and production functions are of the Cobb-Douglas form.
The condition that the local government budget be
balanced, which necessiates the former assumption of Haurin's, is
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adopted in other studies (Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1978, for
example) in the form of local public service expenditure exhaust-
ing the gross tax receipt. We feel that this sort of integrated
approach is not necessary and even not desirable because few
local governments ever balance their budget with property tax
revenue alone and because there is a great variation in the way
the tax receipt is spent. For these reasons, it is probably more
useful to analyze the tax and expenditure questions separately.
Carlton (1980) took an approach very similar to ours in analyzing
the intrajurisdictional impact of the tax alone in a closed
monocentric city setting and with a more general function than
the Cobb-Douglas form. We will have more to say about his analy-
sis of the closed city case after we conclude our own analysis of
the same.
One serious problem in almost all the analytical studies
of the property tax is their definition of the tax itself. A
property tax is usually defined as a certain proportion of the
rental income from a residential or other real estate, while most
often in reality the tax is stipulated as a proportion of the
asset value of the property. The two are not equivalent because
as we have seen above the value of a property with the same
rental income can be quite different depending upon the future
growth of the income stream. The neglect is apparently due to the
comparative static framework which all the existing analyses
adopt because under the assumption of housing malleability the
housing rental, land rent, and optimum land use density are not
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affected by the future growth of rentals which causes the differ-
ence between the two taxes. But we shall see below that, if we
introduce the durability of housing, the two versions of tax have
somewhat different implications as to the land and housing market
as well as to the generation of tax revenue. Of course, in some
municipalities housing rental is the legal base of tax assessment,
and also it is conceivable that in others the actual assessment
is based on housing rental even when the statutory stipulation
says otherwise. The issue is to be empirically decided, and we
will analyze both versions of tax - which we will call housing
rental tax and property value tax - in comparative static
(section 2) and dynamic settings (section 3), and in an open and
a closed city.
5.2 Comparative Static Analysis of a Housing Rental Tax
As we mentioned above, the property value tax is largely
irrelevant in the comparative static framework because the base
of the value tax, the stream of future rental income, does not
affect the present land use. Therefore we analyze only the tax
imposed as a certain percentage of the rental income of a
housing. With the malleable housing the optimal rule of housing
production requires that the cost of an input be equal to its
marginal value product. Assuming that owners of capital and
structural inputs can peddle their commodity to any market they
like and can avoid the differential tax of a particular commu-
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nity, the cost of capital (r) and the cost of structural input
(c) do not change under the local property tax. The condition of
equilibrium in the housing production under a housing rental tax
rate (m) can be stated as the following.
(1-m)pQ'(k) - rc = 0 (5.1)
R = (1-m)pQ -rck = (1-m)(1-K)pQ (5.2)
where K = rck/(l-m)pQ = Q'(k)k/Q
is the factor share of the structural input
where p is the marginal rental of housing, Q is the density of
housing, k is the density of the structural input, and R is the
land rent. The above is exactly the same as under no taxation
except that the after-tax rental income is substituted for the
before-tax income. Let us denote the after-tax rental as
p = (1-m)p.
Wholly differentiating the necessary condition for
optimality, equation (5.1), with respect to the tax rate m,
dp Q"(k) dQ
-pQ'(k) + (1-m)[Q'(k)-- + p - - = 0 (5.3.a)
dm Q'(k) dm
or
dQ d^p dp 1
-/Q = E(F)-/^p = E(F)[--/p - -- ] (5.3.b)
dm dm dm 1-m
from Lemma 6, with E(F) being the
elasticity of housing production
per land area with respect to the
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net marginal revenue.
Equation (5.3.a) states that an increase in the housing rental
tax rate decreases land use intensity, raises housing rental, or
both; and equation (5.3.b) states the relationship among the
changes in the tax rate, housing rental, and housing density in
an elasticity form. How these effects are realized depends upon
the kind of general equilibrium mechanism that distinguishes
between a closed and an open city.
In an open city, housing consumption per household and
the housing rental should be left unchanged under different taxes
as there is no compensating variation in income; otherwise,
utility level changes in contradiction to the definition of an
open city. Then the after-tax revenue for the housing supplier
falls by the amount of the additional tax, and consequently the
structural and housing densities decrease everywhere:
2
dQ/dm Q'(m) = Q'(k) /(1-m)Q"(k)
from equation (5.3)
= - QE(F)/(l-m) < 0
One notable feature about this effect is that the negative impact
of an additional tax rate is proportionately more severe if the
base tax rate is higher.
Land rent will also decrease, and the burden of the tax
will fall entirely upon land owners by the assumption of capital
mobility. To see it formally,
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dR/dm = d[(l-m)pQ - rck]/dm
= -pQ + [(1-m)pQ'(m) - rck'(m)] = -pQ
by equation (5.1)
That -the land rent is reduced in proportion to the
gross revenue from housing, not proportional to land rent or
net revenue, implies that the negative impact of the tax is
relatively more severe for land which shares a smaller portion
of the total rental income or which is already heavily taxed.
This can be expressed as steepening of the rent gradient.
R'(x) = (l-m)p'(x)Q




dR*(x)/dm = p*(x)K'(k)k'(x)/(-K) < 0
since k'(x) < 0 and hence
K'(x) > 0 by Proposition 3.2
By the same token we can see that the housing density
gradient steepens:
dQ*(x)/dm = dQ*(m)/dx = - [dE(F)/dx]/(l-m) < 0
from equation (5.4) and Proposition 3.2
The population density gradient is the difference
between gradients of housing density and per household housing
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consumption (see sections 4.3), i.e.
n*(x) = Q*(x) - H*(x)
Since the gradient of per household housing consumption does
not change while the housing density gradient steepens, the
population density gradient moves the same way as the latter.
The effect of the tax on the parameters of the city as
a whole can be determined by evaluating the general equilibrium
conditions that the land rent at the border (B) be equal to the
farm rent and that the population be housed within the border
(equations (2.3) and (2.4)). Rewriting the border condition,
R(B) = (1-m)p(B)Q(B) - rck(B)f= R(f) (5.5.a)
(1-m)R(f) (5.5.b)
The first of these applies if the income from farming is not
subject to the same tax as housing, and the second is valid
when it is. The population identity is
B
N =$sx [Q(x)/H(x)]dx (5.6)
where B is distance from the city
center to the border; and
0 is the radian of the city
territory.
If we differentiate the border condition,
dR(B)/dm = R'(m;B) + R'(B)dB/dm
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0 in case farm rent is not subject to
the same tax as housing.




[p(B)Q(B) - R(f)]/R'(B) < 0
since R(f) = R(B) < p(B)Q(B).
Thus we confirm the expectation that the city area shrinks. Total
housing available is the increasing function of housing. density
and available land area and it decreases unambiguously. On the
other hand, housing consumption per household does not decrease.
Therefore, the population must decrease.
The above analysis of the impact of the rental tax on spatial
structure of an open city can be summarized as:
[PROPOSITION 5.1] When there is an increase in the tax rate on
housing rental income in an open city, levels of housing density,
population density, and land rent fall everywhere; their
gradients flatten; the burden of tax is entirely placed on land-
owners; but housing rental or consumption per household does not
change.
In a closed city, the population is assumed fixed and
the level of utility changes instead. We need to determine this
aggregate change in utility before we can evaluate local impacts
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of the rental tax. It is intutitively clear that the level of
utility must decrease as a result of an increase in the tax rate
as we do not consider the effect of additional public services
provided with the added tax revenue. We will nevertheless provide
a formal proof because we need a rigorous specification of the
utility change in order to evaluate spatial consequences. For
this, we first differentiate the border condition with respect to
the tax rate:
dR(B)/dm = -p(B)Q(B) + (l-m)[p'(U)dU/dm + p'(B)dB/dm] = 0
(5.7)
considering only the case where farm rental is not subject to the
same tax as housing.
By analogy to Wheaton's Theorem 3, we can write the
change in housing rental following a change in utility as
p'(U;x) = - 1/H(x)U'(Z;x) 0 < x < B
Substituting in the above,
dU/dm = -H(B)U'(Z;B)[p(B)/(1-m) - p'(B)dB/dm] (5.8)
Now the desired result can be proved by the method of
contradiction. Suppose the utility increases as a result of the
tax increase. Then the bracketed term of equation (5.8) should be
negative and hence dB/dm < 0, i.e. the city shrinks. It can be
easily shown that the same must be true even if the farm rent is
taxed at the same rate as housing. On the other hand, housing
rental decreases everywhere on account of Theorem 3. Then housing
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consumption per household increases because housing is a normal
good, and housing density decreases because the aftertax revenue
decreases. From equation (5.6) we can see that these changes
should result in a reduction of total population, which contra-
dicts the definition of a closed city.
The spatial distribution of the impact can be specified
by evaluating the relative changes in housing rental at different











/p(x) = --- /p(x)H(x)U'(Z;x)
dm dm
We know from Lemma 2 that pHU'(Z), housing expenditure
per household multiplied by the marginal utility of income at a
particular location, is constant over distance if the ordinary
elasticity of housing demand with respect to rental is 1 as in
the Cobb-Douglas utility function and decreases with distance if
the elasticity is less than 1. Therefore the rate of change in
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housing rental increases with distance in the case of inelastic
demand; in other words, the gradient of housing rental flattens.
It means also that the gradient of after-tax revenue per
housing quantity (^p) flattens by the additional tax as the tax
rate is uniform over distance by the assumption and
d^p dp 1
--- /.p = /p- -
dm dm 1-m
Carlton (1980) analyzed the same (a closed city) case
with essentially the same method as ours and reached the similar
conclusions as the above, not surprisingly. But we cannot share
his conclusion that owners of land at more central locations
incur disproportionately heavier burdens of tax. This conclusion
of Carlton's was drawn by inferring from the flattening gradient
of the after-tax housing rental the same change in the land rent
gradient. Let us examine not only the land rent gradient but also
housing and population density gradients as their evaluations can
be made by the same method. We can write the changes in the
gradients resulting from the tax hike as the following.
dQ dp 1
-/Q = E(F)[--/p - - = E(F)^p*(m)
dm dm 1-m
Hence
d dQ dE(F) d^p*(m)
-- (-/Q) = ^p*(m)- + E(F) (5.9.a)
dx dm dx dx
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Likewise,
d dR d^p*(m) dK 2
-(-/R) = /(l-K) + ^p*(m)--/(l-K) (5.9.b)
dx dm dx dx
Finally,
d dn d d
-(-/n) = -Q*(m) + E(p)--p*(m) (5.9.c)
dx dm dx dx
The elasticity of housing production with respect to the
net rental income, the factor share of structure (K) and the rate
of increase in housing rental all increase with distance under
the assumption that housing demand elasticity and substitution
elasticity between structure and land are both less than 1 as we
have discussed above. Therefore, we can see from the above that
all the gradients flatten if the after-tax rental is increased as
a result of a tax hike, in other words, if the housing producer
gains in terms of the net revenue as a result of the tax
increase. This appears unreasonable and we can prove that this
cannot be true in every location. Suppose the after-tax rental
increases everywhere. Then housing density increases from the
above and so does land rent everywhere. The latter is because,
from the definition of land rent,
dR/dm = -pQ + (1-m)Qdp/dm
= (1-m)pQ[(dp/dm)/p - 1/(l-m)]
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But then the city extends its boundary, and with the increased
housing density and decreased housing consumption per household
the total population of the city must increase., in contradiction
to the condition of constant population.
Therefore it must be either that the net revenue, hous-
ing density, and land rent decreases everywhere, or that they
increase in outer parts and decrease in inner parts of the city.
It is not possible to unambiguously decide between the two possi-
bilities. But we can start our evaluation by analyzing a bench-
mark of sorts, the case when the elasticities of housing demand
and factor substitution are both 1, i.e., Cobb-Douglas utility
and production functions. In this case, we have already shown
above that the before-tax and after-tax rentals of housing in-
crease at the same rate at all locations or that their gradients
do not change. Also in this case the factor shares and elasticity
of housing production per land area are constant over distance
(Proposition 3.2). Therefore, it is easy to see from equations
(5.9) that gradients of housing density, land rent, and
population density remain constant after the tax change.
Also we know that the utility and housing consumption of
each household decrease with the tax rate. Thus the density of
housing must also decrease in order that the total population
remain constant, implying that the after-tax rental decreases
everywhere. It is intutitively clear that this last conclusion
should hold for the case where the elasticities of housing demand
and factor substitution are in the vicinity of value 1, which
could be true empirically. Then the only unambiguous evaluation
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we can make about the gradients of equation (5.9) is that the
gradients of land rent and housing density flatten as a result of
the tax hike if the ordinary elasticity of housing demand with
respect to housing rental is (slightly) less than 1 and the
elasticity of fagtor substitution is equal to or over 1. Under
the more plausible circumstances that both elasticities are less
than 1, however, we cannot make any analytical judgement about
the direction of change of the gradients.
5.3 Dynamic Analysis of the Property Tax
In this section we examine the impact of a tax on
housing rental as well as a tax on the capital value of a resi-
dential property, particularly their impact on housing construc-
tion and land value. Only the case of an open city will be.
explicitly analyzed because it is difficult to specify the
general equilibrium of a city with durable housing when the
utility level is variable under different conditions. The rental
price and per household consumption of housing at each location
do not change in an open city since the parameters of housing
consumption, namely, income, transportation cost and the utility
level of a household, remain constant under different taxes.
For a given housing rental stream a raise in the rate of
the tax, m, on housing rental income of each period reduces the
capitalized net marginal value of unit quantity of new housing by
as much as the additional tax rate:
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d T -rt'
d^F/dm = d(l-m)F/dm = - (1-m)pe dt' = - F(0,T)
dm 0
(5.10)
where T is the time to replace the present housing.
The optimal density of the structure should meet the
condition that the capitalized value of the net marginal rental
income stream be equal to the marginal cost of construction:
(1-m)FQ'(k) - c = 0 (5.11)
Wholly differentiating this condition we find that the
rate of reduction in the structural density of new housing fol-
lowing a raise in the tax rate is proportional to the present tax
rate and the elasticity of housing production per land area with
respect to the marginal value, E(F):
dQ
-/Q = Q*(m) = - E(F)/(1-m) (5.12)
dm
Since the elasticity of housing production increases
with distance if the factor substitution is inelastic (Lemma 6),
the density decreases relatively more at locations farther from
the center, i.e.
d dE(F)
-Q*(m) = - /(1-m) < 0
dx dx
In examining the impact of a tax hike on land value we
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will simplify the analysis by assuming that the new housing will
last infinitely. It can be verified by straightforward arithmetic
that the conclusion does not change if we consider a series of
finite life-spans of successive development, but it will greatly
complicate the presentation. Under the assumption,
V = (1-m)FQ - ck = (1-m)(1-K)FQ
and
dV/dm = -FQ since (1-m)FQ'(m) = ck'(m) by (5.13)
Thus we can see that the landowner shoulders all the added tax
burden as should be expected from the assumption that owners of
nonland factors and the city residents can all move their loca-
tions to avoid the added burden. It can also be seen easily that
the burden relative to the land value is larger at farther dis-
tances because the factor share of structure increases with
distance under inelastic factor substitution
d dV dK 2
-(-/V)= - -/(1-m)K < 0
dx dm dx
An important question in the dynamic analysis is how the
timing (t*) of development and redevelopment is affected by a
change in the tax rate. Using the same technique as in chapter 4,
we can write the effect as




sign[dt*/dm] = sign [J"(m,t*)]
because J"(t*) < 0 in order for t* to be the unique
optimal time for maximization.
where J'(t*) = ^P(t*,-) - R(t*)
= ^P(t*,-) - (1-m)p(t*)Q(t*) + rck(t*)
Here the after-tax rental income from the existing land use,
^P(t*,-), would be R(f), the farm rent, if the site considered
for housing development is not subject to the same tax as urban
housing; (1-m)R(f) if the farm income is subject to the same rate
of tax as housing; and (1-m)pq if the considered site is pre-
sently used for housing whose density is q. Let us begin with the
first case where the after-tax farm income does not change under
different rates of the rental income tax. Then we need only to
consider the change in the urban shadow rent specified in the
third equation of (5.15).
R'(m;t*) = - pQ + (1-m)pQ'(m) - rck'(m)
= - pQ - (1-m)Q'(m)(rF-p) by equation (5.13)
= - pQ - (l-m)Q'(m)F(t*)
= Q[-p + E(F)F'(t*)] by equation (5.14)
If we write the average rate of rental growth as g,
p(t*) = (r-g)F(t*, ) and F*(t*) = g
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by Lemma 3.
Also, by the same token as in Proposition 3.1,
g F*(t*) < r(l-K)
Substituting in the above,
R'(m;t*) = FQ[g(l+E(F)) - r]
(5.16)
< FQKr(s-1)
since E(F) = sK/(l-K)
The last term of the above is clearly negative when the elasti-
city of factor substitution, s, is smaller than 1. Thus,
J"(t*,m) = - R'(m:t*) > 0
Hence, dt*/dm > 0 , i.e., the conversion is delayed at the margin
of the city. This means that the physical size of the city is
smaller under a higher rate of the rental tax. This, in combina-
tion with the reduction in housing density everywhere, in turn
means that the population of the city would be smaller, too.
On the other hand, if the factors can be substituted
more freely, the conversion process can be hastened under a
sufficiently fast growth of housing rental. That is, if g in
equation (5.16) is large enough campared with the discount rate
so as to make the bracketed term positive. This is because under
certain circumstances the shadow land rent for housing increases
even while the net rental income is decreases. This paradoxical
result is possible as the high substitution elasticity makes the
149
housing construction more sensitive to the change in marginal
value of the net rental stream and hence the optimal structural
input, k, decreases more than the net rental income, (1-m)pQ.
Even if we consider the change in rental income of the
existing housing or farm, the basic conclusion remains valid.
Since the land use itself is fixed for the existing use, the
change in the after-tax rental income can be written as the
following.
d(l-m)R(f)/dm = -R(f)
= - [(l-m)pQ - rck]/(l-m)
d(1-m)pq/dm = -pq
since J'(t*) = 0
= - pQ + rck/((l-m)
= -pQ + rFQ'(k)k
= FQ[-r(r-g) + rK] = FQ[g - r(l-K)]
Combining this with equation (5.16),
J"(t*,m) = FQ[g - r(l-K) - g(l+E(F)) +r]
= FQC-g + rK] (5.17)
> FQKr (1-s)
The final condition for the sign of dt*/dm again reverts to the
case where the existing farm use is not taxed at the same rate as
urban housing, contrary to intuition. The only difference is
that, with the elasticity of substitution larger than 1, it would
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take a lesser rate of housing rental growth to make the sign
negative and hence development or redevelopment schedule advanced
under the even-handed taxation than under a more favorable
taxation on existing uses.
Under the ususal scheme of the property tax, the tax
bill is supposed to be proportional to the capital value of a
property regardless of the present rental income. The equilibrium
for the property owner is reached if the rental income and
capital gains cover not only the opportunity cost (r) of the fund
invested in the property but also the tax bill proportional to
its capital value. The condition can be formally stated as the
following, with the rate of tax w-and the property value Y.
(r+w)Y(t) = p(t)q(t) + Y'(t)
This is exactly the same as any capital market equilibrium condi-
tion except that the effective discount rate in this instance is
the market rate plus the tax rate. Therefore the effect of a
change in the tax rate can be analyzed just as the case of a
change in the discount rate which we have dealt with in section
2.4.
For a new housing development whose life-span is infi-
nite, the change in the capital value of unit quantity of housing
can be given by the following which is equivalent to Lemma 4.
dF/dw = - F/(r+w-g) (5.18)
It is immediately apparent that the proportionate reduction in
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the value of housing is larger for locations where the future
rental is expected to grow faster (larger g), i.e., at outer
locations in a growing monocentric city.
The reduction in the optimal development density follows:
dQ dF
-/Q = E(F) -/F = - E(F)/(r+w-g) (5.19)
dw dw
One difference in the rate of reduction in density under
the value tax from that under the rental tax is that the rate
becomes smaller -if the present (before change) tax rate is
larger, whereas under the rental tax the opposite is true.
The variation in the rate of reduction in the develop-
ment density, the marginal capital value of housing (old or new),
and the land value across locations are similar under the two
versions, that is, more severe at outer locations. However, the
relative impact of the property value tax can be less severe at
farther distances in a declining city where the rate of decline
in housing rental is greater at farther locations. It contrasts
with the effect under the rental tax that would always be more
severe at farther distances as long as the elasticity of substi-
tution is smaller than 1. To wit, by the same procedure as in the
analysis of the rental tax, the difference in the proportionate
tax burden on the landowner can be stated as the following.
d dV dK dg 2
-(- = --- /(r+w-g) - (1-K)--/(r+w-g)
dx dw dx dx
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It can be seen from this expression that the conclusion regarding
the impact of the rental tax that the burden of tax grows (or
decreases) over distance because of the negative first term is
strengthened if the city is growing in general and the second
term is negative, but it is mitigated if the city is delining (or
the substitution elasticity is high.)
The impact of the tax on timing of housing development
or redevelopment can be determined by differentiating the fol-
lowing condition of land use change with respect to the tax
rate, as in the previous analysis.
J'(t*) = P(t*,-) - [pQ - (r+w)ck] = 0
In this case we do not need to pay attention to the rental income
of the existing land use because the tax does not affect period-
by-period rental income itself. Differentiating the bracketed
term, which is the urban shadow rent,
R'(m;t*) = pQ'(m) - ck - (r+w)ck'(m)
- (r+w-g)FQ'(m) - FQK - (r+w)FQ'(m)
- FQ[-E(F) - K + E(F)(r+w)/(r+w-g)]
by equation (5.19)
Eg(E(F) + K) - K(r+w)]FQ/(r+w-g)
Therefore,
J"(t*,m) = - R'(m;t*) < 0
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if and only if
g > K(r+w)/(E(F)+K) = (r+w)(1-K)/(l+s-K) (5.20)
However, the growth rate of the housing rental is limited by a
condition similar to Proposition 3.2 which for this case is
g = F*(t*) < (r+w)(l-K)
Therefore the condition (5.20) can be satisfied only if the
elasiticity of substitution is larger than the factor share of
structure. If the elasticity of substitution is close to 1 as
some authors suggest, this may be satisfied. But in order that
the sufficient condition for the inequality (5.20) be satisfied
the growth rate must be very large, close to the upper limit
given by the last condition. Thus we can conclude that the
development would in general be delayed, more so in areas where
the housing rental is growing slower, with the possible exception
for locations at or close to the city limit where development can
be facilitated. Therefore the reduction in the rate of the
property value tax would generally facilitate redevelopment of
inner city areas and possibly discourage urban encroachment upon
the surrounding farm land.
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CHAPTER 6. REVIEW OF EVIDENCE AND ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
Chapters 2 and 4 have concluded with a very general
prediction: urban land rent and value increase proportionately
faster at locations farther from the center in a monocentric city
whose population, median income, or transportation efficiency is
growing consistently -- be it an open or a closed city, be the
process of change comparitive static or dynamic, or be it under
myopic or perfect foresight. The pattern is symmetric: the con-
clusion is reversed if one of the above measures of urban size is
decreasing while the others are not increasing, and if the obser-
vation is moved beyond the border of the urban area. The excep-
tions to this pattern are obtained only under conditions infre-
quently observed in the real world: if the city declines in one
of the principal measures of city size but increases in another,
or if the city grows through gradual removal of legal or physical
barriers to territorial expansion. In these special cases we
cannot make an unambiguous prediction. Under the assumption of
comparative static change, the conclusion on land value is
directly carried over to the pattern of land use intensity or
population density. With durable housing, the theoretical corres-
pondence can be confirmed for a more limited number of instances.
In the introductory chapter we claimed that the general
conclusion is strongly supported by empirical evidence and that
our framework complements previous comparative static or dynamic
analyses by clarifying many ambiguities. We will try to substan-
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tiate these claims in this chapter. This chapter deals only with
the changes in patterns of land value and population distribution
in urban growth. There is little empirical or theoretical
research on intraurban differentiation of impacts of the property
tax beyond what has already been reviewed in chapter 5.
Although we have focused our attention primarily on land
rent and value, most existing research has focused on population
distribution, the pattern of which is obtained by inference in
our analysis. Therefore, we first review empirical evidence of
flattening density gradient around the world and over many
decades presented by many scholars, and the standard theoretical
explanation for it.
6.1 The Standard Model of Urban Population Distribution
It was well known from very early days that inner city
areas are more densely populated than outer areas. Colin Clark
(1951) studied the phenomenon quantitatively and concluded:
"That the falling off of density is an exponential function ...
appears to be true for all time and all places studied, from 1801
to the present day, and from Los Angeles to Budapest. This main-
tenance of the exponential relationship is, however, compatible
with very different rates of decline of density, as measured by
the coefficient b."





log n(x) = log n(O) - bx
where n(x) is the number of people per land area at x
miles form the city center;
e is the base of natural logarithm; and
b is the coefficient mentioned in the quotation
from Clark, (absolute value of) density
gradient unique for a city.
Although it is now used as a standard empirical tool,
there has been a substantial controversy about the theoretical
validity and empirical usefulness of the negative exponential
function. The focal point of contention is the implicit assump-
tion that the density gradient is uniform at all places in a
city. This is not a proper context in which to belabor the de-
tails of the arguments, but three summary observations appear
relevant. First, the function has never been espoused as a gene-
ral theory by its proponents but only as an empirical hypothesis
which can be given a rough theoretical justification. In that
spirit, the single gradient parameter should be interpreted as
the average gradient not necessarily implying exactly identical
values for all locations. Second, despite its simplicity, even
many of its critics acknowledge that it explains empirical pheno-
menon at least as well as many more complicated functional forms.
(See McDonald and Bowman, 1976.) Third, and most important, its
single parameter of density gradient offers the important advan-
tage of comaparability over time and cities that other compli-
cated functional forms cannot offer.
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Table 2. Clark's Density Function


















































































































In the foregoing theoretical analysis we have been con-
cerned with local gradients whose values may vary among loca-
tions. However, we have shown that except fbr a few specific
cases the gradient moves in the same direction at every location
of a growing city. Therefore, our prediction of flattening
density gradient should show up in the flattening of the average
gradient estimated on the basis of the-exponential funtion.
Clark noted that there is a tendency for the gradient to
flatten over time (see his regression result reproduced in Table
2) and attributed this mainly to improvement of transportation.
But a more comprehensive explanation of the tendency as well as
the above mentioned justification of the exponential function
itself was offered by Muth(1969). Since his work remains the
core of the standard theory of the changing pattern of population
distribution, we will review his theory and empirical
verification in detail.
As we have seen in chapter 2, population density is
simply the inverse of land area per capita, and the density
gradient is the signed inverse of the gradient of land consump-
tion per capita. Since land consumption is an explicit argument
of utility in Alonso's model, per capita land consumption and
hence population density are directly obtained from solutions for
a consumption optimization problem under given conditions of
general equilibrium. However, land enters as a factor in the
production of housing in Muth's system where housing is a primary
argument of utility. In this case it is necessary to consider
utility and housing production functions together in order to
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figure out per capita land consumption. The population density
gradient can now be expressed in terms of demand and production
parameters.
n*(x) = - L*(x) = Q*(x) - H*(x)
= p*(x) [E(F) + E(p)] (6.2.a)
from Lemma 6, with the static housing rental
gradient p*(x) substituting for F*(x);
and equation (2.7.b)
where
p*(x) = - a'(x)/pH (6.2.b)
from Wheaton' Theorem 3.
The approach taken by Muth in determining the comparative
statics of the density gradient was direct and partial. He sought
to assess the impact of a certain exogenous shock on one or the
other variable in the above equations. First, an increase in
income will increase the housing expenditure, denominator in
equation (6.2.b), and hence the rental price gradient flattens.
Reduction of marginal transportation cost has the same effect as
it reduces the numerator.
An increase in population would increase the housing
rental. If the compensated elasiticity of housing demand with
respect to housing rental is larger than 1 as Muth assumed,
housing expenditure decreases, and as a result the rental gra-
dient would steepen. On the other hand, the elasticity of produc-
tion of housing per land area with respect to housing rental,
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E(F) in equation (6.2.a), decreases with increasing rental if the
elasiticity of substitution between land and structure in housing
production is less than 1 (see Proposition 3.2.) This will have
the effect of flattening the density gradient. The net effect,
then, should be determined by comparing magnitudes of these
opposite effects by the use of empirically determined parameter
estimates. Muth argued the net effect is the flattening of the
gradient because the price elasticity of housing demand is only
slightly over 1. If housing demand is inelastic with respect to
rental, as we suggested in chapter 2, there is no ambiguity in
concluding that the rental and population gradients flatten.
By the same token, he observed, elasticity of production
decreases if housing rental is raised as a result of an increase
in the price of structural inputs or in the property tax. But
this is wrong because the housing price increases at a rate less
than the input cost, especially if housing demand is elastic as
Muth assumed, and the elasticity of production decreases only if
the housing rental increases faster than the cost of input (Pro-
position 3.2). On the other hand, housing expenditure is reduced
when the housing price goes up if housing demand is elastic.
Therefore, the net effect should be unambiguously a steepening of
the density gradient, contrary to Muth's conclusion. The effects
of the property tax should be similar: We have seen in chapter 5
that the population density gradient would steepen in a closed or
an opencity under inelastic factor substitution and elastic
housing demand.
Even if a lower value of housing demand elasticity is
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used, our framework yields the same conclusion that an increase
in the price of the structural input steepens the density gra-
dient. An increase in the price of structural input amounts to a
reduction of real income and of farm rent. We have seen in
chapter 2 that the former steepens the population gradient for an
open or a closed city. Reduced farm rent does not affect the
gradient in an open city, but steepens it in a closed city.
Therefore, the effect is unambiguously a steepening of the
gradient for either type of cities.
The opposite should be true in case the availability of
total land increases, and Muth's conclusion that the density
gradient steepens as a result should be amended likewise.
As can be noticed in the above discussion, a more serious
problem of Muth's approach is the neglect of interdependencies
among variables and parameters of the equations (6.2) that define
the population density gradient. His separate consideration of
each determinant suggests that he dealt with a closed city, while
his use of compensated elasticity in determining the effect of
increased rental on housing expenditure suggests an open city.
These are a minor problem in deriving the theoretical results,
but the lack of recognition of the interdependencies hampers
interpretation of theoretical and empirical results, as we shall
see shortly.
Muth also considerd aspects that do not strictly belong
within the comparative statics of a monocentric city. It can be
easily seen that the concentration of manufacturing employment in
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the central city will steepen the gradient, and the existence of
multiple subcenters will flatten it. It is also apparent that a
large presence of old and substandard housing in the central area
would lower the number of inhabitants there, and hence flatten
the density gradient.
He also argued that the income elasticity of demand for
land is greater than that for structure, and increasing income
will therefore shift the demand in favor of a more distant loca-
tion where households can consume more land. This is the argument
frequently repeated by subsequent analysts as the most influen-
tial factor. However, it is in fact a spurious explanation.
First of all, available evidence suggests that the income
elasticity of demand for land is smaller than that for housing as
a whole and hence smaller than that for the structural component
alone (see King, 1976, and Wheaton, 1977). If it is very large,
the ordinary price elasticity of demand for land can go higher
than 1 (see the discussion in section 2.2) and increasing popu-
lation can cause the gradient to steepen in a closed city. Other-
wise, the income elasticity should not have any direct effect on
the relative desirability of locations. This is because the
market mechanism will ensure that land rent is distributed so
that income effects are canceled out and households are indif-
ferent to any location and the specific combination of land and
structure that is optimal at the location. We have discussed
(while explaining Proposition 2.6) that a shift of demand in
favor of a farther location is caused by the difference in the
marginal utility of additional income in the case of a closed
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city, regardless of the income elasticity as long as it is
positive.
Despite these errors (by our judgement), little extension
or amendment of the basic theory has been offered by others.
Muth's empirical test of the theory also remains the most compre-
hensive in terms of the coverage of determinants of the density
gradient. He estimated regresssion coefficients (b) of the log-
linear version of the equation (5.1) with population density data
for 25 census tracts of each of 46 metropolitan areas of the U.S.
in 1950. Then he evaluated the determinants of the cross-
sectional variation by means of the ordinary least squares
regression with the absolute value of the density gradient for
each city (b in equation (6.1)) as a linear function of various
factors suggested by his theory. One of the two final equations
identify the following as the significant independent variables.
In the following list (-) signifies the flattening effect, and
(+) the steepening effect.
car registration per capita, as a surrogate
for transportation technology (-)
median family income (-)
total metropolitan population (-)
proportion of black population (-)
proportion of substandard housing in
the central city housing stock (-)
concentration of manufacturing employment
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in the central city
These results are,- in short, consistent with Muth's pre-
diction. The last three variables are not dealt in our analysis
but the first three are, and Muth and we agree on their expected
effects. Though car registration per capita was used to account
for transportation technology which usually is extremely hard to
quantify, it in fact may be considered a variable reflecting
income level and thus may have exacerbated the collinearity
problems that we elaborate on below.
In another of the final equations, the following two
variables were added:
cost of construction material
dummy variable for a water-front city
(-)
(-)
The negative coefficient of the construction cost appa-
rently supports Muth's (mistaken) hypothesis and contradicts
ours, but its standard error was larger than the coefficient
itself. The second, significant at the 15% level, contradicts
Muth's hypothesis and supportsours.
More critically, the addition of the latter two variables
made the coefficient of the income term statistically insig-
nificant. This term was also found to be very sensitive to
different specifications that were tried for intermediate reg-
ressions. Muth expressed a puzzlement about this result espe-
cially since this contrasts with the consistent significance of
the coefficient of the popualtion 'term whose effect Muth consi-
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dered to be more ambiguous. The same problem appears in many
empirical works by other authors. Mills and Song (1979), for
example, found that the coefficient of the income term is statis-
tically insignificant but positive in a regression of density
gradients of Korean cities using only population and income as
the explanatory variables.
The problem is probably a symptom of high collinearity
involving the income term. The median per capita income has a
very high correlation with population in theory as well as in
reality, especially in developing countries where the urban
system is highly open. In Muth's regression, income is perhaps
correlated with per capita car registration and construction cost
also.
Collinearity is known to reduce the efficiency of estima-
tion and hence make one or the other of the collinear variables
appear statistically insignificant. There are numerous examples
of econometric studies plagued by the same. For example, in
studies of consumption functions, the coefficient of assets or
lagged consumption is often found to be insignificant. As is the
case in this example, we cannot consider that the statistical
insignificance of the income term reflects real insignificance,
but that the regression coefficient of one or the other of the
highly collinear variables cannot be estimated and interpreted
properly without prior restrictions imposed by extraneous data or
theory. In this case we should take theory as the guide and
consider the susceptibility of the income term to specification
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as the evidence of collinearity.
Mills's empirical study (1972) of population distribution
of the U.S. cities represents a most significant extension of
Muth's analysis. This study nicely complements Muth's, as it
examines not only cross-sectional but also historical variations
in the density gradients, not only population but also employment
distributions, not only the final pattern but also the adaptive
process. Mills's compilation of historical density gradients
shows that the trend of flattening goes as far back as estimation
is possible (year 1880, see Table 3) and that it is also true
with the distribution of major categories of employment.
For 18 U.S. metropolitan areas Mills obtained gradients
of population, and manufacturing, retailing, wholesale, and
service sector employments for 1948, 1954, 1958, and 1963 by
means of a unique short-cut (see Mills, 1972; for the criticism
of the method, see Harrison and Kain, 1974). For some of these
cities he could estimate a population density function going back
to 1880. To identify important determinants of the density gra-
dients, he estimated regression equations similar to Muth's,
including the median family income, total population, a time
trend, and the lagged density gradient as the independent
variables. The first two are conventional and.show the expected
effects of flattening density gradient. Here again the coeffi-
cient of income term is less significant (17% level) than that of
the population term, which is significant at the acceptable 10%
level.
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Table 3. Mills's Density Function Estimates for U.S. Cities
I = Density gradient
D = Central city density
(a) Population Density Functions of Six Metropolitan Areas,
1929-63






































Average Gradients of Population and Employment Density
of the Six Metropolitan Areas
Sector 1920 1929 1939 1948 1954 1958 1963
Population* .84 .73 .67 .57 .46 .41 .36
Manufacturing .95 .82 .77 .76 .67 .60 .48
Retailing n.a. 1.02 .90 .76 .73 - .58 .41
Services n.a. n.a. 1.12 .88 .81 .70 .55
Wholesaling n.a. 1.43 1.24 1.01 .89 .77 .59
* Figures in columns headed 1929 and 1939 are for 1930 and 1940 respectively.





















































(b) Population Density Functions of Four Metropolitan Areas,
1880-1963
Year Baltimore Milwaukee Philadelphia Rochester
1880 Y 1.82 .97 .30 1.78
D 244,730 44,287 39,948 51,400
1890 7 1.08 .92 .28 1.83
D 89,300 70,804 45,555 81,600
1900 Y 1.05 .90 .28 1.59
D 101,200 92,374 56,611 74,500
1910 7 0.93 .78 .28 1.20
D 90,100 77,764 64,772 58,400
1920y .70 .61 .25 1.18
D 69,238 68,304 67,595 72,729
1930 y .64 .56 .37 .96
D 67,630 74,209 62,034 58,464
1940 7 .60 .51 .36 .88
D 65,542 65,434 59,787 50,775
1948 -f .48 .47 .31 .73
D 51,159 58,318 53,264 39,682
1954y .40 .37 .27 .55
D 42,693 44,262 45,714 28,194
195871 .36 .32 .25 .47
D 37,481 37,823 41,868 24,033
1963-f .33 .27 .23 .40
D 34,541 31,123 38,268 20,527
Average of Population Density Gradients
of the Four Metropolitan Areas
Average AverageYea gradient Year gradient
1880 1.22 1940 .59.
1890 1.06 1948 .50
1900 .96 1954 .40
1910 .80 1958 .35
1920 .69 1963 .31
1930 .63
Source: Mills (1972), pp. 48-49
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Table 4. Determinants of Density Function Coefficients
of 18 Metropolitan Areas, 1948, 54, 58, 63
Dependent Constant Log Log SMSA Log SMSA Lagged
variable term population median sector time dependent R'
family incomne employment variable
Population log f .9069 -. 2829(10)-1 -. 1021 .1415 .9046 .967(.9806) (-1.2017) (-.9073) (1.8125) (19.8500)
log D .1756(10)1 .1679(10)-1 .6223(10)-s -. 4877(10)-1 .7939 .919
(1.1508) (.6691) (.0323) (-.3634) (20.0988)
Manufacturing log - -. 1380 -. 4706(10)-1 .3845(10)-1 .1020 .8676 .850(-.2182) (-.6185) (.7928) (1.0838) (12.4121)
log D .8332 -. 7051(10)-1 .1034 - .6320(10)-' .8621 .959(1.1807) (-.7355) (1.1985) (-.5330) (20.5795)
Retailing log Y -. 1460 .7614(10)-1 -. 8330(10)-l -. 2608 .8672 .937
(-.1893) (.4579) (-.5464) (-4.2090) (12.4597)
log D 3.4309 -. 4434 .5069 -. 3362 .6519 .653
(1.7690) (-.9936) (1.1295) (-1.8762) (6.6274)
Services log Y -. 1539(10)1 .3161 -. 2978 -. 1240 .8554 .903
(-2.1154) (2.4304) ( -2.3830) (-1.7319) (12.5529)
log D -. 1245(10)1 .3343 -. 1497 -. 3123 .7572 .833
(-1.07411 (1.4860) (-.6753) (-2.4748) (12.0124)
Wholesaling log Y - .954% .1499 -. 1226 - .9226(10)-t .9969 .939(-2.0377) (2.1250) ( -2.0460) (-1.6932) (18.7097)
log D -. 2373 .1518 -. 9531(10)-l -. 1583(10)-1 .8610 .909(-.2780) (1.0848) (-.6707) (-1.3432) (14.6125)
Regression equation:
D. = a. + aPu + atYa + at + (1 - A)Da-, + 'li
Y= X + -. piPa Y +8t+(1 - )Wi. .. + e+
where D = density at the center
I = density gradient
P = total metropolitan population
Y = average family income
t = year
a, A = regression coefficients
A, . = adjustment coefficients
i = city
(variables all in logarithm)
t-values are in the parentheses
Source: Mills (1972), pp.54-59.
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Dropping many of Muth's variables that are highly correl-
ated with income could have resulted in higher significance of
the income coefficient. But the inclusion of the time trend
variable must have negated the potential gain in efficiency of
estimation, since the income level has gone up consistently over
time while populations of many metropolitan areas have not. A
time trend is commonly used in many econometric studies to repre-
sent myriad influences associated with time and which cannot be
otherwise attributed, but it is very hard to interpret. Mills
interpreted the significant positive sign of the term's coeffi-
cient as meaning the secular increase in the cost of transporta-
tion, the net effect of the increase in the cost of travel time
due to rising income outweighing cost reduction through improve-
ment in transportaiton technology and road network. But there
appears to be no clear ground to support or refute this
interpretation.
A lagged dependent variable has a clear enough meaning,
used in dynamic analyses to represent the lag in adjustment. In
this case the density gradient of the previous period represents
the inertia of the urban spatial pattern due to high durability
of urban structures. The coefficient was found to be the most
significant of all independent variables and close to 1, signi-
fying very slow adjustment of the gradients to changing conditions.
We will not review a host of similar studies of density
gradients since they are mostly confirmations of the results
obtained by the above two studies without notable methodological
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improvements. Instead, we reproduce as Table 5 the compilation by
Mills and Tan of many research results from around the world,
demonst.rating that the trend of flattening density gradient is
not limited to the U.S. and European cities.

















































Source: Mills and Tan (1980), Table 11
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6.2 Dynamic Analyses of Urban Spatial Structure
Muth's theory of population distribution is clearly a
comparative static theory with some informal embellishments of
dynamic elements. While Mills identifies the durability and the
"disequilibrium" nature of land use as an important part of
urban spatial process, his description of the process is a ver-
sion of the standard model of aggregate stock adjustment that
does not acknowledge the difference in adjustability among loca-
tions and among different vintages of urban land use structures.
This essentially comparative static framework has been chal-
lenged by theorists who conceptualize the change in land use as
radically different from the succession of static spatial
patterns. We review in this section a few important contribu-
tions in this direction, their main themes and limitations, with
particular reference to how they concur with or differ from each
other and from our analysis.
Durability is explicitly incorporated as an essential
element of urban spatial structure in several large scale econo-
metric models of urban housing and employment distribution (by
NBER and by Rothenberg, for example). But a clear statement of
the concept within the framework of a simple monocentric city
model was first made by Harrison and Kain (1974). Their model
"depicts urban growth as a layering process" on the theory that
"current levels of population, transportation costs, and other
factor prices determine the density of development during this
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period but the density of past and future development depends on
the level of these variables during those time periods." (Ibid.)
Empirically, they define development density as the
ratio of single family housing to total new housing built in
each period. This ratio is specified as a function increasing
with time and decreasing with total existing housing stock of a
city. This function is estimated by a regression with data for
83 U.S. metropolitan areas for 17 time periods from pre-1879 to
1960. They assume that each new development is added at the ring
immediately next to the existing urban area (the layering
process).
Then, for easy comparison with other studies of popula-
tion distribution, the negative exponential function is fitted to
the density profile that consists of computed densities of
successive rings. Unfortunately, density functions thus obtained
show a disappointing inconsistency with those obtained by Muth
(above cited study) and Barr (1970, unpublished, quoted by
Harrison and Kain). Harrison and Kain's density gradients of 11
cites are correlated with Muth's with the R-square value of only
0.03, though the correlation improves if the range of comparison
is enlarged to 32 cities. Nor do their density gradients show any
trend of flattening over time. It is important to remember that
Muth's and Barr's density functions are empirical estimates from
data of actual popualtion distribution, as are the trend of
flattening density gradients; Harrison and Kain's are the outcome
of a simulation based on their particular model of urban spatial
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growth.
The poor performance of the model was attributed by the
authors to the neglect of several factors, most important of them
being the alteration of existing housing and variations in the
size of a building lot. But even after most neglected aspects
except the alterations are corrected for with additional data,
the density profile is still quite far from actual figures. This
may indicate either a serious drawback in the scheme of the model
or the great importance of housing alterations. But it is hard to
pinpoint where the critical problem lies. Since their principal
explanatory variable of the incremental density is a time trend
which only begs another explanation, we do not have any expli-
citly specified relationship that links present development den-
sity to present parameters, let alone past or future.
Harrison and Kain's concept of cumulative urban growth
was explicitly and faithfully formalized by Anas (1978). He
assumes, following Harrison and Kain, that developers have myopic
expectations about market parameters and that housing structure
never changes once built. In order to specify patterns of
relevant price variables he additionally assumes that utility and
production functions are Cobb-Douglas, structural inputs are paid
the permanent annuity of interest cost of their purchase price,
and land rent is the remainder of housing rental after the
payment for structural inputs.
Various scenarios of urban growth are analyzed in this
framework, and empirical phenomena are interpreted in light of
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the analytical results. Because his analysis presents a most
clear break from comparative statics of a monocentric city and
his interpretation expresses the high hopes initially placed on
dynamic modelling, it seems instructive to carefully examine
Anas's main conclusions.
He argues that "Harrison and Kain perform an empirical
study of urban densities ... their predictions of densities for
Boston are at least as good as those of the empirical studies of
Mills, Muth, and Barr which are based on long run adjustment
assumptions and do not recognize durability." However, we have
noted above that Harrison and Kain's result is a simulated one
based on particular assumptions and empirical parameters and is
generally not as good as the empirical results that were obtained
by normal statistical methods independent of any particular model
of urban spatial structure.
Anas observes that growth of income and improvement of
transportation in typical American cities explain the negative
density gradient, and that the growth of city population can be
explained by the same factors using the open city model. But his
analysis shows that the density gradient is positive if popula-
tion is growing for a closed city. Then, what should be the model
of a city whose population has been increasing but whose density
gradient is negative?
Third, he observes that land rent is purely an oppor-
tunity rent and land value could be increasing with distance
because of durability if the welfare is increasing. He also
argues that under the same conditions abandonment of central city
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housing can be explained as the result of negative rental price
of housing due to durability. We have seen in chapters 3 and 4
that if structure is assumed to be permanently maintained there
is no opportunity rent or land value for built-up urban land, and
that if land value exists it should decrease with distance in a
monocentric city. Housing abandonment that is explained by Anas
as a result of the negative housing rental cannot be possible if
redevelopment is allowed and no externalities are admitted.
The last paragraph points to the most apparent weakness
of the above two models, namely the assumption of permanent
durabiltiy. As we have emphasized before, durability is primarily
an economic. condition rather than a technical constraint; if the
building is no longer viable there is no reason why it should be
kept indefinitely when the land can be redeveloped profitably.
Anas claims that the assumption is a good approximation because
in the decade of 1950's, for example, only 3.8% of the housing
stock was demolished. But the figure must be viewed in light of
the fact that this is about 17% of new construction on vacant
lots, and that significant additions and alterations of the
existing stock add another 20%. (U.S. Census of Housing, 1960)
This slow but eventual adaptation of urban land use is
explicitly taken into account in later dynamic models of myopic
urban land use by Brueckner (1980) and Wheaton (1982b). Both of
these models have theoretical structures very similar to each
other and to Anas's except for the above mentioned assumption of
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no replacement. Both derive conditions for replacement; Wheaton's
numerical example is close to our example of section 3.3. They
rely on simulation to explicitly describe spatial characteristics
of urban housing. Brueckner simulates an open city where income,
population, and utility growth are exogenously specified. Wheaton
simulates a closed city where the level of utility is endoge-
nously determined. Allowing for redevelopment makes density drop
sharply at the border of housing generations as we have
described in chapter 4. Structural density generally decreases
with distance even among the same generation of housing
developments, but this seems to be the result of the discrete
time framework and a slightly increasing level of utility (in the
case of Brueckner's simulation). Must we then think of the gene-
ral decline of population density over distance as merely a
historical accident as the cumulative growth model implies, or
as evidence that the utility level increased over time?
We are inclined to answer "neither" on two grounds.
First, we have seen in section 4.3 that population density will
decrease with distance even under myopic foresight in the case
where the size of a dwelling unit is adjustable during the life-
time of a building. Although alteration of the size is certainly
costly, it is probably not so prohibitive as adjusting the
housing density itself. This is because splitting up a house
usually is not a very costly proposition and because passive
adjustment is possible and frequent: even if house size remains
fixed, if there are heterogeneous households they choose housing
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so that the size fits their characteristics.
Secondly, myopic foresight is perhaps not a good descrip-
tion of developers' expectations in the real market place. We
have seen in the discussion toward the end of chapter 4 that the
housing density would probably decline with distance under
rational expectations unlike the case under myopic foresight.
There are a number of models that assume perfect foresight on the
part of developers. We have seen in chapter 2 that in most ins-
tances it is sufficient to assume rational expectations, not
necessarily perfect foresight, to obtain results essentially dif-
ferent from myopic foresight models. Of many perfect foresight
models we review here two of the recent efforts by the same
authors as above: Brueckner and von Rabenau (1980) and Wheaton
(1982a).
The structures of'the two models are quite different.
Brueckner and von Rabenau investigate a setting with two periods
and three locations where one land use change is possible;
Wheaton studies a setting with continous location and multiple
time periods but with no redevelopment. Brueckner and von
Rabenau show that declining density is the most plausible out-
come of urban growth under perfect foresight. Wheaton provides a
set of simulations most of which show general decline of popula-
tion density. But in one of Wheaton's five simulations, where
population continues to grow while income and transportation cost
remain constant, density increases with distance over a fairly
long stretch of distance and housing vintages. A close examina-
tion of the simulation result reveals that this positively
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sloping density curve occurs during periods of very slow physical
expansion, confirming our prediction of section 4.3.
As we have mentioned in section 4.2, these authors also
suggested and demonstrated the possibility of reversed, outside-
in growth of a city under perfect foresight. In analytical
terms, however, their specifications of the condition for such
development paths are rather ambiguous. Brueckner and von
Rabenau say that the pattern is possible under fast enough
growth of housing rental over time, but obviously this necessary
condition is not at all informative.
Wheaton clarifies the situation by an ingenious exten-
sion of Alonso's bid rent approach. A piece of land held until,
and developed at, a certain period generates a certain maximum
surplus; a different surplus if developed at another period.
These can be called land values bid by different options of
developing land at different periods. If an option of develop-
ment at a particular period outbid all earlier development
options, the land will be held until that period. For this
waiting to be longer at more central locations, the bid value
function for a later development option must have a steeper
slope in distance. This is shown to be equivalent to the condi-
tion that the rate of increase in optimal population density be
larger than the discount rate. Defining the condition in this
way, in terms of parameters of development, makes it easier to
quantify the situation. Still, it remains to be specified in
terms of urban growth characteristics and utility and housing
180
production functions, those that define the optimal population
density. For this Wheaton presents simulations of different
growth paths employing a log-linear utility function. The reverse
growth pattern is shown to result when income is decreasing (3%
per year) while population grows (3% per year).
Our analysis provides a clue why this development path is
obtained. We have seen in chapter 2 that the housing rental
gradient steepens if income decreases in a closed city under very
general utility function. On the other hand, the population
increase leaves the gradient of the housing rental unchanged
because the log-linear utility function assumes that an ordinary
price elasticity of housing is 1 (Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.8).
Therefore, the net effect is the steepening of the housing rental
gradient, and the reversed expansion path would result as we have
concluded in Proposition 4.7.
We have reviewed major strands of the evolving literature
on urban spatial dynamics: from Harrison and Kain's pathbreaking
introduction of the concept of cumulative growth, Anas's formali-
zation of the concept, Brueckner and Wheaton's introduction of
replaceable housing and their subsequent consideration of expec-
tations more complex than myopic ones. Our contribution can be
assessed clearly in this context. First, we further the develop-
ment toward generalization of expectation schemes, by adopting
rational expectations and replceabilty of housing, and toward
generalization of utility and production functions by limiting
them only by a range of demand elasticity and substitution easti-
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city. Second, by establishing a set of general yet simple rules
of durable land use we have been able to determine some important
issues of dynamics without relying on the opaque method of simu-
lation. Third, we have shown that a clearly defined concept of
land value can aid both the analysis of durable land use as well
as the analysis of the land value dynamics itself which has been
largely neglected by analysts despite its practical importance.
6.3 Empirical Patterns of Land Value Appreciation
Empirical patterns of population density change reviewed
in the first section should be considered evidence for our pre-
diction of the spatial pattern of land value appreciation thanks
to the theoretical dependence between the two variables. More
direct evidence seems indispensable, however, because land value
is in itself at least as important as land use density and
because one cannot take the mechanism relating the two variables
as granted.
Our conclusions regarding land value appreciation rates
were set out in the comparative static version (Proposition
2.10) and the dynamic version (Proposition 4.6), which are
qualitatively identical, and summarized at the beginning of this
chapter. We have also argued in the introductory chapter that the
predicted pattern, faster growth of land value in outer areas,
has been widely observed empirically and almost taken for
granted. Nevertheless, this has not been so systematically inves-
tigated as the density pattern probably due to the well known
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problems in quantity and quality of land value data. Land tran-
sactions are not frequent. Nor are they straightforward as they
usually involve complex credit arrangements and the like. Assess-
ments tend to be unreliable if they exist at all. But, where
there is a reasonable set of data on land value changes, analysts
made good use of it, and our conclusion is well tested for.
In the U.S., Chicago's land values for a hundred years
since the infancy of the city were compiled by Homer Hoyt
(1969), and those for the twentieth century have been published
in Olcutt's Blue Book series. Mills used the former compilation
to analyze the relationship between land value and distance from
the city center in different years. His estimation of three
different regression equations is reproduced in Table 6. The
linear function does not fit the data well, but the log-linear
and double-log land value functions clearly confirm the decline
of land value over distance in all the years studied, 1836,
1857, 1873, 1910, and 1928.
Of central interest to us is the overall trend of secular
growth in (or decline in the absolute value of) the distance
coefficients of the two logarithmic functions. We have shown
before (equation 2.6) that the increase in the distance coeffi-
cient of the log-linear function, which is the logarithmic gra-
dient, means that the land value appreciation rate increases over
distance. It can easily be shown that the distance coefficient of
the double log function also has the same property. Then Mills's
result clearly shows that land value appreciated faster in more
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Table 6. Land Value Function of Chicago, 1836-1928




















































































: V(x) = A + bx
: log V(x) = A + bx
log-log : log V(x) = A + b log x
where x is the distance from the city center, miles
V(x) is land value at distance x
t-values are in the parentheses
Source: Mills (1969), pp.245-247
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distant locations in every interval since 1857. Thanks to the
fact that the two regression equations are single parameter
models we can test the significance of difference in the coeffi-
cients for adjacent years by use of the reported t-values. Under
both specifications the increase (flattening) of the gradient is
statistically significant at less than a 1% confidence level.
Although the trend is apparently marred by the steepening of land
value gradient from 1836 to 1857, this opposite direction of
change can be easily reconciled with our theory once we closely
examine the nature of the data.
Chicago was but a tiny settlement of eight thousand
people occupying an area of barely four square miles in 1836
(Hoyt, 1939). The ensuing booms of the railroad construction and
the Civil War brought a forty-fold increase in population to
about 320,000 in 1871, who were spread over all over the present
legal boundary of the city, which extends about nine miles to the
west and twenty five miles to the north and south, although much
of the area was not tightly filled in until the early twentieth
century. The picture is not clear for the year 1856, but we
presume that the extent of the settlement was small compared to
the present city area as the population in 1857 was about 90,000,
less than one third of that in 1876. Nevertheless, Hoyt reports
land values for all locations within the present city limit, and
Mills uses this full data for his regression.
Therefore, we can infer that the land value changes
that are reported for 1836 to 1857 mainly concern those outside
the urban settlement. In those areas, the land value gradient
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should steepen, i.e., land values would increase faster at loca-
tions closer to the city boundary according to our hypothesis for
the case of a city growing under rational expectations. The
gradient might very well have flattened within the city, but in
estimation of the land value function it probably was dominated
by the steepening trend in the majority of the study area.
Chicago land values of the twentieth century reported in
Olcutt's Blue Books were analysed by Yeates (1965). He estimated
a double-log equation including four distance variables
(distances from the city center, area shopping center, transit
station, and lake Michigan), and two other variables (of popula-
tion characteristics). The result of his regression is reproduced
in Table 7. Despite the added specifications which would have
reduced the statistical significance of the parameters, the coef-
ficients of the distance from the center are significant and show
the expected negative sign and the trend of flattening over time.
In fact, most of the other distance variables show the same
consistent behaviour, rendering support to the suggestion that
the influence of distance from the city center on land use
variables is generalizable to other distance variables. (Refer to
the discussion in section 1.2) Here, again, the pattern opposite
to our prediction for a growing city is shown to have occured in
the decade of the great depression (1930 to 1940).
McDonald and Bowman (1979) report the continuation of the
flattening of the land value gradient in their study of Chicago
land values for 1970 and 1980, but reviewing this work in detail
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Table 7. Chicago Land Value Functions, 1910-60
Yeates' Regression Results
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
Multipleiq 77 65 37 34 24 18
b, -. 837* -. 673* -. 268* -. 275* -. 268* -. 173*
- b -. 038 -. 122* -. 156* -. 134* -. 080 -. 092*
b3 -. 450* -. 414* -. 367* -. 285* -. 227* -. 146*
b4  -. 248* -. 240* -. 214* -. 140* -. 152* -. 050
bs +.105* -. 008 +.039 +.044 -. 016* -. 137*
be +.005* +.001 -. 003* -. 002* -. 002* -. 002*
Correlation between
log ci and log pi -. 63 -. 56 -. 23 -. 18 -. 20 +.04
* means significantly different from zero at 0.05 level.
Regression Equation:
log V = a + b, log C, + b2 log Rt + bs log M
+- bt log E + bs log P, + b N,+ e
where: V, = front foot land value
Cj = distance to central business district
R, = distance to nearest regional shop-
ping center
M = distance to Lake Michigan
E, = distance to nearest elevated train
or subway station
Ptr- population density
Nj = percentage of non-white popula-
tion
e = error
i = "ith" sampling point
Source: Yeates (1965), pp. 57-64
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Table 8. Land Value Functions of Four Korean Cities, 1965-75
SEOUL
A -b

















0.724 0.582 83,000 222,000
(34.3) (22.5)
0.671 0.611 101,000 314,000
(38.3) (25.5)
0.723 0.483 191,000 547,000
(43.9) (30.0)
TAEGU SUWON
A -b 2 A -b R2














0.818 0.621 51,000 210,000 0.675 0.819
(33.9) (38.2) (14.6) (10.8)
69,000 261,000 0.581 0.766
(41.5) (38.9) (14.4) (9.9)
t-values are in the parentheses.
Regression Equation: same as the log function of Table 6.
Res. means residential land value; Com. commercial.






























In Korea, various classes of land values are assessed
annually by a quasi-public body. Mills and Song (1979) estimated
the log-linear regression equation for four Korean ~cities cover-
ing various years of 1960's and early 1970's. Their result,
reproduced in Table 8, shows that the gradients of commercial as
well as residential land values flattened even over fairly short
intervals (two to three years) in these rapidly growing cities.
Population of the four cities grew at the annual rate of six to
eleven percent during the studied period. The flattening of
residential land value gradients during the short intervals are
statistically significant at 7.5% level of confidence,
except for Pusan where the significance level is about 15%. Com-
paring gradients of different cities we note that the gradient of
Pusan, -whose seaside and hilly terrain severely limit the supply
of land for urban use, has the gradient flatter than that of the
much larger city of Seoul. This is consistent with our predic-
tion of Proposition 2.9 regarding natural and institutional bar-
riers to urban expansion. Otherwise, the larger the city, the
flatter is the gradient, again as expected.
There are a few studies that report the same general
pattern of land value change in European cities. One of them, a
wide survey of many cities (UN, 1973) concludes as follows.
The expansion of city functions within a metropolitan area has
brought a more rapid price increase in areas far from the
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center of the town. Data on the development of land prices at
Copenhagen,... Paris, Lyon, Milan, Zurich are significant for
many metropolitan areas in different countries...
The data on which this conclusion is based were not
processed through standard statistical techniques and conse-
quently are not easily comprehensibe without the accompanying
text to which we refer the readers. For yet another study of land
value of European cities in support of our argument, readers are
referred to Hallett (1979).
The foregoing renders an abundance of empirical evidence
to our hypothesis. A rigorous support for it is found in the
statistical significance of shifts in the land value gradient
reported by Mills(1968) and Mills and Song (1979). However, the
skeptic still might argue that the reported trend only provides a
joint test of the negative exponential function as well as our
own hypothesis,.but it does not strictly verify either hypothesis
in isolation. A more straightforward approach is to estimate the
relationship between the distance from the center and the land
value appreciation rate itself directly.
For this we analyze changes in residential land value of
districts of Seoul, Korea, for the period from 1963 to 1976. The
data consist of annual assessments by the Korea Appraisal Board
of Grade A (good) residential land value of each district (but
1966 data are missing). Aerial distance from the city Hall to
the municipal administrative office of each district (Dong) is
used as the measure of the distance. Availability of published
190
land value series (by Korea Home Builders' Association) and
identifiability of districts on the official map limited the
usable observations to 55. There are now about 700 districts in
the city of Seoul but land value series for only about 80 of them
were available presumably because many of the present districts
are recent annexations of previously rural areas or subdivisions
of old districts. Apparently name and area changes also occured
preventing a reliable match between the available land value data
and the official adminitrative map for more districts.
Seoul has a constrictive terrain for a city of seven
million population (1982 estimate): its expansion is limited by
steep hills to the north and the northwest of the city center, a
large hill to the immediate south of the city center, and then
the river beyond the hill. Thus it grew mainly towards the east
and the northeast and a little to the west until the early 1960's
when it began to break into areas beyond the hills and the river.
These new sections now constitute a larger urban area than does
the area along the older east-west axis.
In its most general form, our hypothesis simply posits
an (increasing) monotonical relationship between land value
appreciation and the distance in a growing city, and another
(decreasing) monotonical relationship in a declining city or
outside the boundary of a growing city. Such a relationship can
be tested by the method of Spearman's rank correlation coeffi-
cient which has an advantage of being robust and approaching its
asymptotic property for a small number of observations (about
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10). We identified eleven to thirteen districts lying along each
of the east-northeast, west-northwest, and south corridors of
development, and computed the correlation between ranks of dis-
tance and of land value appreciation rates for 1963-70 and 1970-
76 periods. The result is summarized in Table 9 below.
The magnitudes of most of rank correlation coefficients
(Spearman's Rho) indicate that the hypothesis of the monotonic
relationship between land value appreciation and the distance
cannot be rejected at a 3.0% confidence level. Even the correla-
tion for the southern areas in the 1970's is still significant
at the 7.5% level.
Table 9. Rank Correlation between
the Distance from the Center and Land Value Appreciation Rate,
1963-70 and 1970-1976
Direction from Number of Spearman's Rho
the city center observations 1963-70 1970-76
East and Northeast 12 .918 * .694 *
West and Northwest 13 .804 * .701 *
South, including South of 11 .711 * .579
the River
note: coefficients marked with * are significant at 3.0% level.
If the observations were to be pooled, we would have a
sample of fair size with which an ordinary (parametric) sta-
tistical analysis would be viable. But due to the above men-
tioned difference between the new and old areas of development
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we felt that all the observations should not be pooled together.
We therefore divided them into two groups of a still reasonable
number of observations: 27 districts on the east-west axis
(sector A) which form the traditional city territory, and 28
districts to the south and north of the City Hall (sector B)
ma.ny of which began to be built up only since the 1960's. Land
value appreciation rates were taken for 1963-67, 1967-70, 1970-
73, and 1973-76, as well as the longer intervals, 1963-70 and
1970-76.
Though our hypothesis has not been specified in a
parametric form so far, *an appropriate one should feature such
properties as are found in the quadratic function specified
below: The dependent variable, the rate of growth in land value,
would increase with the distance from the city center up to the
bondary of the city and decreases with distance thereafter. We
would expect the inflection point to be visible, i.e., the coef-
ficient of distance to be positive and that of squared distance
negative, provided that our data points include districts beyond
the full-fledged urban area.
2
V*(ti) = a(t) + b(t)x(i) + c(t)x(i) + e(it) (6.3)
where V*(t,i) is the land value appreciation
rate of district i for the period t,
i.e., difference between logarithm
of land value of the beginning of
the period and that of the end of
the period;
x(i) is the distance from the City Hall
to the district i, in km;
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a(ts), b(ts), c(ts) are regression
coefficients to be estimated for
each sector s (sector A, B, or the
whole city, T) and period t; and
e(i,t) is the error term.
The point of inflection, or the distance of the border
B*(s,t), can be determined by differentiating the equation:
B*(st) = -b(st)/2c(st)
We estimated equation (6.3) by the ordinary least
squares method assuming as usual that the error term is normally
distributed with mean of zero and the variance independent of
the variables of regression. However, the result showed a clear
presence of heteroscedasticity: the error terms (regression
residuals) were larger for farther distances, threatening the
viability of the OLS estimation. After a few experimentations
with various weights, we found that weighting by the reciprocal
of distance restores the distribution of residuals to reasonable
approximation of homoscedasticity in most cases. Therefore we
simply divided both sides of the regression equation by the
distance and estimated it with the OLS method.
But even after the modification the second problem
remained: despite large values of R-square, it seldom happened
that all the coefficients are statistically significant in esti-
mations for sector A and the whole city. This problem signals
the insignificance of the border effect in the traditional
sector (A). The sector has been almost fully developed to the
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sample limit which coincides with the real topographical limits,
a large mountain range to the east and the river to the west,
though they are far removed from the city center unlike the above
mentioned barriers to the immediate north and south. If there is
no inflection point, one of the distance terms is superfluous,
and its inclusion can only harm the estimation by imparting bias
and inefficiency. Suspecting a nonlinear relationship, we chose
to drop the linear distance term, bx, from the equation and
instead estimate the following.
2
V*(t) = a' + c'x + e (6.4)
Weighted least squares estimation of this equation pro-
duced significant coefficients for almost all estimations as
well as reasonably homoscedastic distribution of residuals. The
result is reported for sector A and the pooled data in Table 10.
The simplified equation performed well enough also for sector B
which contains the newly developing areas. Estimation of the
equation for each sector and the combined sample showed that the
difference between the sectors are not significant enough to
invalidate the pooled regression.
But the original equation with bx is retained to be
reported for sector B because it produced useful information on
the city border with larger R-square values while seriously
hurting the significance of coefficients only for one period,
1967-70. The calculated inflection distances are 9.7km for the
1963-67 period, 10.3km for 1970-73, and 10.7km for 1973-76.
195
There would certainly be many other factors besides the
distance from the city center whose inclusion would be advisable
for the sake of realism and explanatory power of the regression
equation. However, such a practice can be confusing to the theo-
retical argument involving a simple model. The reported result
clearly indicates that the distance variable has a strong enough
explanatory power to stand alone in accounting for the differ-
ence in land value appreciation. The strong fit of these equa-
tions with essentially one independent variable is a pleasant
surprise considering the level of abstraction of the theoretical
model behind the regression equation, and it confirms the more
indirect or casual evidence we have reviewed above.
In sum we believe the empirical evidence reported above
supports our theoretical prediction almost to the point of redun-
dancy, though the quality of each piece of evidence might be
called into question. The most well documented is the part of the
conclusion concerning land value appreciation within the growing
city, but other implication regarding those outside the urbanized
area in a growing city and those during times of decline is also
evidenced at a few instances.
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Table 10. Regression of Land Value Appreciation on
the Distance from the Center, Seoul,Korea.
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REGRESSION EQUATION: Equation (6.3) for Sector B;
Equation (6.4) for Sectors A and T.
SECTORS: T: All 55 districts; A: 27 districts; B: 28 districts
STANDARD ERROR is in the parentheses
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL: * significant at 2.5% level;
** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10% level.
UNITS: Land Value - Thousands of Won (current) per pyeong;
Distance - km.
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